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The War on Terror, Middle-East Peace, and a Drive around the Ranch: the Rhetoric of 
US-Saudi Diplomacy after 9-11
Chairperson: Dr. Shiv Ganesh
In a rhetorical examination o f the communicative phenomenon o f diplomacy, this study 
analyzes White House rhetorical strategy following a meeting between George W. Bush 
and the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. An analysis o f White House statements following 
the April 25, 2002 meeting reveals the use o f two rhetorical strategies used to promote 
US-Saudi policy: prophetic dualism (Wander, 1984) and domestication (Schiappa, 1989). 
In one collection o f appeals, for example, White House rhetoric makes use o f a prophetic 
dualism (1984) in highlighting the ‘importance’ o f the relationship to peace in the 
Middle-East and in America’s ‘war on terror.’ Here, I argue, official rhetoric creates a 
new rendition of the Cold War Drama (Stuckey, 1995) with reference to a new rhetorical 
backdrop provided by the ‘war on terror.’ In a second strategy, official rhetoric 
domesticates (Schiappa, 1989) the US-Saudi partnership by describing the relationship 
through a set o f relational metaphors. Here, I argue, White House rhetoric expands 
previous notions o f domestication through the use o f themes like mutual appreciation, 
shared respect, and personal bonding to personify the relationship. In light o f these new 
adaptations o f rhetorical strategy, scholars must continue to explore the innovations and 
new uses o f Hybrid strategies (Stuckey, 1995) as they appear in foreign policy address.
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US-Saudi Diplomacy 1
The War on Terror, Middle-East Peace, and a Drive around the Ranch: the Rhetoric of
US-Saudi Diplomacy after 911
The major communicative problem this study will examine is one embedded in a 
complex multi-faceted relationship between two world powers: the United States and 
Saudi Arabia. From the 1930s until the present, the US’s relationship with this leading 
Arab oil producer has satisfied a number of its most vital economic and strategic 
interests. In the post September 11th period, the American public’s increased concern 
over national security and the war on terror has given rise to a number of public 
criticisms of its relations with Arab countries, in particular Saudi Arabia because of its 
unique proximity to the events of 9-11. Nonetheless, the United States continues to 
legitimate and promote its policy toward this long-time ally which is a vital economic and 
strategic partner (Baer, 2003; Unger, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). The Saudi Kingdom, 
however, maintains a conflicted relationship with the United States that poses a challenge 
to these efforts.
On the one hand, the Saudis remain the key exporter of US energy needs through 
their vast petroleum reserves. In addition, they continue to play an integral strategic role 
in US foreign policy through their accommodation of US troops stationed in the 
Kingdom as well as their active partnership in several extensive clandestine military 
operations. Their key support of US energy and strategic interests is balanced however, 
by their ties to Islamic terrorism and their questionable role in the September 11th attacks. 
The Kingdom’s allegiance with Wahhabi Islam, its funding for religious schools that 
preach anti-American rhetoric, and its role in sustaining what some experts have called a 
hot-bed of Muslim extremism have invited criticism from audiences in the US and
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abroad. Taken together, these conflicting views of the relationship bring great difficulty 
to the task of promoting a pro-Saudi position in the US. For the Bush White House, this 
task is even more challenging because of the Bush family’s close ties to the House of 
Saud.
In terms of its social and political importance, the US-Saudi relationship deserves 
scholarly attention because of its impact on global events and world history. This 
relationship has played a role in many major world events -the  emergence of the global 
oil market, World War II, the Cold War, the Iran-Iraq war, ongoing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts, the creation of OPEC, the Afghan wars, the rise of fundamentalist terrorism, 
Osama bin Laden, and the attacks of September 11th, to name a few. At the same time, 
despite the magnitude of this relationship’s impact on world affairs, its stature in public 
discourse has often been diminished and frequently over-simplified. Pundits and critics 
frequently refer to the “oil weapon,” the “Saudi Vote,” or “Bandar Bush,” which all make 
the simplistic suggestion that the Saudis have an influential presence with US policy­
makers simply because they own us (Michael Moore’s “George of Arabia” Rolling Stone, 
Oct. 30, 2003). In fact, critics frequently ignore the multiplicity of interests involved in 
the relationship, assuming that oil is the only motivating factor. Indeed, as I will discuss 
in this thesis, the real nature of US Saudi relations is much more complex and 
ambiguous, involving multiple national and corporate interests, numerous historical 
variables, explosive regional influences, and ongoing domestic political developments in 
both Washington and Riyadh -all over the course of a 60-year partnership. Despite the 
relationship’s complexities and subtleties, its appearance in public discourse has been
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condensed; for this reason, an examination of the rhetoric surrounding this diplomatic 
relationship can help inform current and future public discourse.
As a communicative phenomenon, the rhetoric surrounding this relationship 
offers a unique opportunity for scholars to explore intersections between history and 
public discourse. For rhetorical scholars, particularly those focusing on foreign policy 
rhetoric, this study will add to current understanding of the rhetorical forms and strategies 
that officials use to support foreign policy and diplomatic relations. Also promising is an 
enriched explanation of how foreign policy rhetoric relates to the historical context in 
which it is situated.
In terms of theoretical value, the academic community should find additional 
significance in a study that addresses both international relations and communication 
issues respectively. US-Saudi diplomacy involves a number of issues that should attract 
researchers in both fields, from geopolitical energy and security issues to intercultural, 
rhetorical, and organizational discourse. Further, considering the unique issues rooted 
within diplomatic relationships like this one, it should come as no surprise that at the 
National Communication Association’s most recent national conference several scholars 
made the case for better integrating these two unique disciplines (Albert, 2004; Dimitrov, 
2004; Harper, 2004; Hayden, 2004; Shuter, 2004; Yook, 2004). Hence, the topic of US- 
Saudi relations carries added significance for communication scholars interested in fusing 
the two disciplines for the purpose of gaining greater clarity through inter-disciplinary 
collaboration.
As its chief objective, however, this study aims to explore the communicative 
phenomenon of diplomacy. Because it is the primary communicative vehicle through
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which governments interact, it serves the academy, the public, and the international 
community to better understand and conceptualize the intricate nuances of this dynamic 
human process. Serving this interest, an inquiry into the US-Saudi relationship may help 
facilitate a deepened consideration of diplomatic interactions in other international 
situations.
It is important to look at the relationship between official rhetoric about US-Saudi 
diplomacy and its overall historical context because it offers a telling account of one of 
the most influential global relationships of the 20th century. Indeed, this unique 
relationship has played a pivotal role in historical events of the past century and beyond. 
From World War II to the 1973 oil embargo, and through the Israel-Palestinian conflict to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, this relationship has had tremendously influential 
economic, political, strategic, and cultural dimensions. From the September 11th attacks, 
to the war in Iraq; from the recruitment, funding, and training of A1 Qaeda and Osama 
Bin Laden to the stabilization of Oil Prices during the US incursion into Iraq, the Saudis 
have played a defining role. Therefore, to better understand America’s past, as well as its 
forthcoming role in international affairs, an examination of the rhetoric of US-Saudi 
affairs will offer an insightful view of this key partnership.
To this end, I will take a rhetorical approach in analyzing the messages used to 
promote and legitimate the US-Saudi relationship in the post-9-11 period. Here, the 
study will examine the strategies evident in official White House rhetoric in high-level 
diplomatic meetings with the Saudis. Hence, the study’s first and second formal 
questions arise:
[RQ-1]: How does official rhetoric relate to the overall historical context of US-
Saudi relations?
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[RQ-2]: What strategies have President Bush and other White House officials 
used to discuss the US-Saudi relationship during the post-September 11th period?
In the remainder of this chapter, I will review relevant literature on the rhetorical forms of 
foreign policy rhetoric before addressing the historical analysis required to answer RQ1. 
Next, I will discuss the methods this study will employ, including a description of its data 
corpus.
Literature Review
A study that combines historical research with rhetorical analysis requires a 
unique blend of previous research. In order to address RQ1,1 will provide a brief 
overview of US-Saudi relations to 1) summarize the major characteristics and key 
dimensions of the relationship, and 2) address the relevance of these themes in light of 
official rhetoric. Here, a comprehensive review of US-Saudi relations (discussed below 
on p. 23) will identify key events and trends throughout the relationship’s history.
Several key historical sources will provide the foundation for the history chapter, and are 
discussed below in the methods section.
In order to answer RQ 2, a comprehensive review of rhetorical strategy is too 
extensive and unnecessary for this study. However, to provide theoretical background to 
explore this second question, I will rely upon a specific genre of public address research 
within the larger field of rhetorical theory. Within this literature, a considerable volume 
of scholarship has examined rhetorical conventions of foreign policy address (Ivie, 1980; 
Wander, 1984; Schiappa, 1989; Stuckey, 1995; Hoolihan, 1986). I will review previous 
scholarship on foreign policy rhetoric, paying close attention to studies that explore
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various rhetorical strategies situated within the context of international affairs. Below, I 
will outline several of the strategies identified by these authors before explaining how 
they will inform the rhetorical analysis.
Rhetorical Strategies in Foreign Policy Rhetoric
Previous scholarship identifies three conventional strategies evident in foreign 
policy rhetoric: value-oriented, pragmatic, and hybrid. The primary distinction between 
these strategies is seen in their reliance on moralistic, value-oriented descriptions versus 
pragmatic interest-based explanations. This chapter will first outline examples of several 
value-oriented strategies and the various descriptive appeals that support them. Next, I 
will turn to examples of pragmatic strategies and their accompanying appeals which 
embody distinct metaphoric descriptions of international affairs. Finally, I will discuss a 
third hybrid strategy that combines elements of both value-oriented and pragmatic 
strategies. By way of introduction, a brief description of each strategy is in order.
Value-oriented strategies become evident when official justifications for foreign 
policy appeal to moralistic or dramatized notions of good and evil, right and wrong, or 
fear and redemption (Studkey, 1995; Bostdorff, 2003; Wander, 1984). For example, 
Bostdorff (2003) has explored President Bush’s use of moral and religious metaphors to 
frame foreign policy decisions in the Post-September 11th period. In what Stuckey 
(1995) describes as a foreign policy drama, Bush describes the US’s war on terror in 
distinctly moralistic terms, describing our “crusade” against the “evildoers,” and need for 
a new national mission to combat this external evil (Bostdorff, 2003, 293, 303; Bush, Jan.
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29, 2002). These value-laden strategies dramatize foreign policy issues and allow for 
appeals to moral values that are commonly recognized by the general public.
In other cases, official rhetoric uses a pragmatic strategy that focuses on ‘national 
interest.’ For example, in George H.W. Bush’s announcement of the invasion of Iraq, he 
emphasized the importance of protecting Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, two key sources of 
oil (Hilsman, 1992). Outlining the nation’s vital interests in the Saudi oil supply and the 
secondary interest of protecting Israel, Bush appealed to the notion of national interests 
rather than a dramatized struggle between good and evil. Pragmatic strategies rely on 
appeals to a more rational sense of national interest, mutual benefit between nations, and 
other themes that fit within a realist’s framework of international affairs and foreign 
policy respectively.
Drama, Morality, and Value-Oriented Strategies
Value-oriented strategies rely on a number of descriptive metaphors, which vary 
depending upon the subject matter and its historical context. The victimage ritual for 
example, is a rhetorical strategy that has frequently appeared in US justifications for 
military action (Ivie, 1980). Ivie (1980) identified what he called “victimage rhetoric,” 
wherein the Johnson administration justified the Vietnam War through the use of a 
savagery metaphor (1980, 279). This metaphor emphasized the distinction between 
moral and amoral, right and wrong, and good and evil, allowing for moralistic judgments 
to justify military action. Johnson’s rhetoric created the impression that the US was 
drawn into conflict by North-Vietnamese communists who posed an imminent and 
unprovoked threat to the free world, a depiction fueled by the fear of an unknown danger
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threatening the free world as per th e ‘domino theory’ (1980,279). Casting America’s 
communist opponents as violent and aggressive, and contrasting them with an image of 
the US as a reluctant free nation acting out of last-resort, the administration utilized this 
“victimage” ritual outlined by Kenneth Burke (1954; 1967), to justify the US incursion 
into Viet Nam. This “victimage” strategy relied on several different descriptive 
metaphors.
The Johnson administration described the US’s actions by juxtaposing three 
different dramatic metaphors: force vs. freedom, irrational vs. rational, and aggression vs. 
defense -a ll fitting within larger topoi of savagery (Ivie, 1980, 279). Although each 
metaphor appealed to a general sense of right and wrong, good and evil, etc., they were 
each distinct metaphors deserving individual discussion.
The force vs. freedom motif relies upon a portrait of one’s adversaries as 
“unspeaking brutes who know no respect for human liberty” (Ivie, 1980, 288). This 
metaphor dramatizes on one hand, a forceful and brutish enemy to contrast a hesitant but 
noble nation who values freedom on the other. The contrast arises in President Johnson’s 
depiction of the looming communist threat as a violent and forceful opponent who 
necessitated a response from the US in the interest of preserving freedom.
Similarly, the irrational vs. rational dichotomy built upon the notion of an 
“unspeaking brute” by emphasizing the irrationality of communist aggression. This 
dichotomy characterized the communist threat as an “irrational and lawless antagonist in 
opposition to a rational and law-abiding protagonist” (288). The notion of irrationality 
attached to the aggressor helped justify the notion of a ‘rational’ response and also helped
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bolster the public’s impression of the use of American force to stop this apparently 
unwitting aggressor.
The aggression vs. defense motif is a little different in its rhetorical orientation 
because it attempts to establish a cause-effect situation in which the US is responding to 
an aggressive threat; hence the US’s actions appear involuntary as opposed to voluntary 
(290). It builds upon notions of force vs. freedom and rationality vs. irrationality, to 
support a specific military action. The metaphor describes US intervention as a defensive 
maneuver as opposed to an offensive one. Perhaps only by constructing an apparently 
forceful, irrational, and aggressive nation can officials claim that an American incursion 
is a defensive response to a looming aggressor as it were. Strategically, each of these 
three metaphors fits within the same conception of warfare, in which the US’s adversaries 
are cast as antagonists against a monstrous aggressor. The US and its allies can appear a 
reluctant protagonist drawn into a seemingly unavoidable conflict. Other value-oriented 
strategies describe conflict through similar dramatic metaphors.
Phillip Wander (1984) identified a strategy he called “prophetic dualism,” which 
bears close resemblance to victimage rhetoric (1980). This rhetorical strategy describes 
the larger context of a particular conflict or foreign policy scenario through the use of 
moralistic dualisms like good vs. evil and right vs. wrong. Employed by the Eisenhower- 
Dulles administration, prophetic dualism “divides the world in to two camps... One side 
... is good, decent, and at one with God’s will. The other acts in direct opposition,” and 
the resulting conflict between the two is solved only by the victory of good over evil 
(Wander, 1984, 342). Like Ivie’s force vs. freedom motif (1980), the adversary is • 
depicted as acting in discord with universal notions of “freedom,” “morality,” and
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“universal good” (1984). This strategy also appeals to a religious or moral conception of 
good and evil, as one side must appear “good, decent, and at one with God’s will” (1980, 
342). Indeed, both strategies rely upon the assumption that the world is divided into 
different parties with simple, clear, objectives -one right, and one wrong, good and evil, 
etc. This reliance upon a morally-dichotomous depiction of the world appears in another 
dramatic strategy employed during the Cold War.
Exploring what she called foreign policy drama, Stuckey (1995) explored another 
value-oriented strategy, the Cold War drama. Employing this strategy, supported by the 
use of Wander’s prophetic dualism (1984), officials described the US-Soviet conflict 
appealing to similar notions of good and evil used during the Viet Nam war. Officials 
created a dualism between good and evil, best seen in President Reagan’s famous 
depiction of the Soviet Union as the “evil empire.” Aided by the Soviet Union’s fervent 
suppression of religious freedom, this metaphor was particularly salient because of its 
ability to frame a complex international situation into simplistic dichotomy between good 
and evil (Stuckey, 1995). So in part, this characterization operated as a kind of 
simplification mechanism by interpreting a complex set of historical and political 
circumstances into a condensed and easily-understood moral metaphor (1995).
Simplification also occurs through another type of value-oriented strategy 
Schiappa (1989) called Nuke Speak, or “the use of metaphor, euphemism, technical 
jargon, and acronyms to portray nuclear concepts in a neutral or positive way” (253). 
Schiappa (1989) studied President Reagan’s explanations of nuclear weaponry to find 
two different value-oriented strategies: domestication and bureaucratization.
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During the Reagan Administration, defense officials used a domestication strategy 
which relied upon “everyday language to describe the extraordinary in ordinary terms” 
(Schiappa, 1989, 255). Examples of this strategy appeared in rhetoric that used “friendly 
metaphors drawn from ordinary language to name otherwise objectionable nuclear 
weapons, strategy, and war” (255). During this period, atomic bombs that neutralized 
the populations of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki for example, bore the names “Fat Man,” 
and “Little Boy” in an attempt to normalize this extraordinary technology (1989, 255- 
256). Words and phrases like “clean,” “super,” “smart,” “hardware,” “arms race,” and 
others were used to describe various weapons and strategy to the public (255-266). In 
sum, Schiappa wrote, “the rhetorical significance of domestication is that it normalizes 
extraordinary technology.”
Bureacratization also normalized the extraordinary, but without readily 
identifiable metaphors. As Schiappa (1989) explained, “Bureaucratization is the 
counterpart to domestication” when “nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, or nuclear war 
cannot be conveyed persuasively through the use of friendly metaphors” (256). In such 
cases, this strategy attempts “either to sanitize the concept so that it appears neutral and 
inoffensive, or to technologize the concept” through the use of “technical terms or 
acronyms that only insiders or ‘experts’” may truly grasp (1989, 256-257). A senior 
military official, for example, described the Titan 2 missile as “a very large, potentially 
disruptive re-entry system’” (1989, 257). In another example, officials called the neutron 
bomb a “ ‘radiation enhancement weapon’” (1989, 257). Showing a similar instance, 
Schiappa offered the following list of prominent acronyms used to describe various 
weapons and technology: MIRV, MARY, ASW, ICBM, SLBM, GLCM, LOW, LUA,
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ELF, EMP, ERW, PAL, MAD, SDI, SBKKV, SALT, BMD, and START (1989, 257). 
The effect of these descriptions, according to Schiappa, “is to mystify -to  render nuclear 
policy irrelevant or inaccessible to public investigation and deliberation”(257). 
Strategically, these simplistic metaphors operate rhetorically in much the same fashion as 
domestication strategies.
Although domestication and bureaucratization are value-oriented strategies, they 
function differently than other strategies like prophetic dualism and the cold war drama. 
Domestication and bureaucratization function negate or neutralize value; rather than 
dramatize they nearly trivialize. Unlike dramatic dualisms between good and evil, etc., 
‘nukespeak’ attempts to lessen the dramatic impact of a particular issue. These strategies 
remove value or notions of dramatic appeal in instances in which, Schiappa would argue, 
drama may in fact have some merit. As Schiappa wrote, Nukespeak “both for [its] users 
and for the public as an audience... functions as a ... ‘terministic screen’” by devaluing 
the thing it describes (1989, 253). Whereas other strategies attempt to maximize a certain 
value or characteristic, both domestication and bureaucratization function to minimize 
these traits. The outcome is akin to a rhetorical camouflage.
Interestingly, each of these value-oriented strategies describes a particular topic 
through dramatic narratives like good vs. evil or right vs. wrong. These strategies help 
re-describe history or technology through the lens of a certain idea or theme. In this 
sense they are both dramatic and metaphorical; they dramatize certain sets of facts or 
events and in doing so, help the public understand these subjects though a particular 
metaphor. Whether describing an act of war through a morally dichotomous framing, or 
using a simple label to reduce moral or ethical questions about nuclear weaponry,
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descriptive metaphors shape lay audience’s understanding of foreign policy issues. They 
allow the public to grasp a topic of complex or enormous proportions -whether a major 
international conflict between two global powers, or an advanced piece of weaponry— 
through interpretation. In the end, these strategies hinge upon the rhetor’s ability to first, 
re-describe the issue or subject in questions, and secondly to reframe the audience’s 
perception of it. There are other strategies that re-describe issues much differently.
National Interest and Mutual Benefit: Pragmatic Strategies
Pragmatic strategies do not necessarily filter history through a particular lens, at 
least not in the dramatized fashion of other strategies. Rather, pragmatic strategies 
explain topics in terms of normative, interest-based rationale. Phillip Wander (1984), for 
example, identified a strategy he called “technocratic realism,” which describes global 
conflicts in terms of mutual interest and negotiation, favoring “hard-headed calculation” 
over simplistic religious or moral framing (349). His examination of the Kennedy 
administration’s rhetoric revealed the Administration’s tendency to describe the world in 
terms of complex and overlapping national interests rather than good and evil, right and 
wrong, etc.. Kennedy’s rhetoric, Wander wrote, “stressed ‘efficiency’ over ‘morality,’” 
(349). Kennedy’s use of technocratic realism hinged on descriptions of the modem world 
that were “much too complex for old time religion... not the prophet, but rather a skilled, 
tough expert is what is needed, one whose mind is untouched by violent and dangerous 
emotions; one who is wise, analytical, precise” (1984, 349). Completely antithetical to 
value-laden strategies, Kennedy’s rhetorical approach seemed distinctly rational rather
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than moralistic. In this sense the strategy embodied realist approach to international 
affairs.
Similarly, Stuckey (1995) explored the use of power politics and new world order 
strategies. These strategies describe nations as “equal moral actors,” who attempt to 
control conflict and avoid confrontation in the interests of the broader international 
system, as opposed to an explicit, over-arching moral good (216). “Instead of a war to the 
death between good and evil,” Stuckey explained, “the new world order posits fluctuating 
levels of conflict between a variety of equally ethical alternatives” (217). These 
descriptions appeal to a sense of realism and fact, and emphasize secular justifications for 
military action, rather than contrasting moral dilemmas outlined above (217). Here, the 
power politics metaphor describes international relations by emphasizing opportunities 
for negotiation based on mutual self-interest between sovereign national actors (Stuckey, 
1995; Wander, 1984). In terms of framing, pragmatic metaphors do not simplify or 
dramatize international events; rather, they acknowledge the complexities and 
overlapping considerations of the parties involved in explaining justifications for 
decision-making. While not amoral, per se, this strategy favors rational rather than moral 
framing.
Values meet Pragmatism: Hybrid Strategies
While value-oriented and pragmatic strategies can operate independently, they 
can also function in tandem with one another. Stuckey (1995) described how official 
rhetoric sometimes combines both strategies to create a kind of composite hybrid 
strategy. George H.W. Bush, for example, explained international conflicts through the
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use of both ‘Cold War drama’ and ‘new world order metaphors’ (Stuckey, 1995, 218).
As Stuckey wrote, Bush “tended to combine the dichotomous moralism of the Cold War 
drama and its ... prophetic dualism with the cooperation demanded by the rhetorical 
forms of the new world order drama” (Stuckey, 1995, 218). The new world order drama 
stems in part from this notion of collective order; it rests on the assumption that a larger 
international coalition of peaceful states attempts to live in accord western notions of 
democracy (1995). By contrast, President Bill Clinton employed a hybrid that coupled 
the power politics and cold war metaphors (1995, 221). Combined with the Cold War 
narrative, the power politics model emphasizes national actors balancing power against 
hegemonic forces like the former Soviet Union (1995). Here, a moral dichotomy 
necessitates a pragmatic interaction between States sharing mutual interest in balancing 
power against a global threat to freedom (1995). These hybrids can be effective because 
they may appeal to both a strong sense of morality while also appealing to a sense of 
rational pragmatism -a  blend of idealism and realism.
In sum, varying arrangements of value-oriented and pragmatic strategies provide 
a comprehensive framework for the following examination of official rhetoric on US- 
Saudi policy. Existing literature is critical of official rhetoric as such messages seem to 
distill information to the public through a number of rhetorical strategies: value-oriented, 
pragmatic, and hybrid. Moreover, whether interpreting developments through a value­
laden lens, or explaining key topics in interest-based terms, official foreign policy 
statements frame and shape issues through the strategic use of language and rhetorical 
forms, acting as a kind of ‘terministic screen.’ In the rhetorical analysis below, this study 
will rely upon the literature reviewed above as a basis for interpreting the strategies in
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President George W. Bush’ s rhetoric in the context of US-Saudi diplomacy after 
September 11th, 2001.
Methods
To answer RQ1, which elucidates a connection between official rhetoric and its 
overall historical/political context, I read a number of historical, political, and 
international texts that describe the intricate history of US-Saudi relations. From these 
texts, I assembled a rough timeline of the relationship, beginning in the late 1930s. In 
doing so, I chose to focus on the major themes and developments of this relationship by 
highlighting its dimensions and functions. I was most interested in developments that 
characterized the interests and motivations of the parties, be they strategic, financial, 
political, cultural, or economic.
In terms of sources, I chose historical accounts according to two criteria. First, 
each source was selected based on its ability to provide a unique or previously 
undeveloped account of a particular aspect of the relationship, either from personal 
experience or through academic expertise. For example, Richard Clarke’s (2004) 
testimony comes from his direct experience as the FBI’s counter-terrorism director 
during several key periods in the relationship. He was directly involved in the hunt for 
Osama bin Laden, negotiations with Saudi diplomatic and military leadership, and the 
nation’s response to the events of September 11, 2001. Clarke, along with several others, 
offers unique personal experience with several key issues within the US-Saudi 
relationship.
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Others may lack such personal experience but still demonstrate a distinct 
expertise with certain facets of the US-Saudi relationship. Historian Craig Unger (2004), 
for example, has extensively covered the Bush-Saudi relationship. Writing on the Bushes 
and conservative politics for the New Yorker, Esquire, and Vanity Fair, Unger has also 
served as editor for the New York Observer and Boston Magazine. Unger’s book, House 
o f Bush, House o fSaud  (2004) focuses exclusively on the development of the Bush-Saudi 
partnership within the larger context of US-Saudi diplomacy. His heavy reliance on 
primary sources, extensive and corroborated interviews with direct participants and 
public officials, and his distinctive reputation as a journalist bolster his credibility when 
discussing the Bush-Saudi component of the US-Saudi partnership. Although the book 
became controversial because of allegations of unethical motives and impropriety via the 
Bush-Saudi family connections, it has withstood criticisms due mainly to the gregarious 
and well-documented nature of its research. The book’s primary weakness, from a 
researcher’s perspective, was its apparent intent to expose a particularly negative aspect 
of the relationship. Nonetheless, his testimony was corroborated by other accounts of the 
relationship (Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004). I selected Unger’s book, like others, because it 
offered a previously undeveloped account of a specific aspect of the US-Saudi 
relationship.
Secondly, I chose texts that showed extensive reliance upon primary sources, 
personal accounts, interviews, and corroborative evidence. Robert Baer (2002, 2003), for 
example, frequently cites de-classified government documents, personal interviews with 
unique sources, and corroborated evidence to support his testimony. Additionally, Baer’s 
career as a foreign case officer with the CIA gives him background knowledge of recent
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and ongoing Middle-Eastern affairs that may surpass those available to a professional 
journalist or historian. For these reasons, Baer is an example of a source that was chosen 
in part for his methods and sources.
To address RQ2,1 explored the post-9-11 period for a major incident involving 
the Saudis that was accompanied by a public response from the White House. I found a 
handful, the most fruitful of which was the Crawford address of late April, 2002, which 
proved ripe for analysis. Although officials previously fielded questions about the 
relationship during press briefings, only at this specific address did the President offer a 
speech that directly approached the issue in positive terms. For instance, instead of 
answering questions about the US-Saudi policy, the President focuses an entire speech 
around the issue, making an affirmative persuasive effort on the subject.
As it followed a historical high-level diplomatic meeting with the Crown Prince 
Abdallah, who previously turned down invitations to meet with the President, the speech 
had an immediate historical and diplomatic context. The speech occurred in the midst of 
several important historical developments: heightened conflict in the West Bank, an 
approaching war in Iraq, and increasing speculation and volatility in world energy 
markets. Adding to the text’s ripeness were several official statements made in the days 
following the address that echoed the President’s key messages. For these reasons I 
chose a data corpus that included 3 Presidential speeches, 3 White House press briefings, 
and one speech by the White House National Security Advisor all occurring between 
April 25 and May 2, 2002. Other incidents, most notably the public exposure of an FBI 
investigation into allegations that Princess Haifa had indirectly funded several 9-11
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hijackers, failed to produce the same volume of official discourse as the Crawford 
address.
In terms of a timeline, the data corpus begins on April 25, when President Bush 
gave a speech to report on his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah at the Bush’s 
family ranch outside of Crawford Texas. The next two addresses were given by the 
President on April 26th, and 28th at the same location. On the 29th, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, 
then National Security Advisor, gave a speech at Johns Hopkins University where she 
addressed the recent meeting between Bush and Abdullah. Also included were two 
White House press briefings held at the Crawford Ranch by Press Secretary Ari Fleischer 
on May 1st and 2nd. Taken together, these statements created a more detailed mosaic of 
White House strategy by illustrating a cumulative message that was consistent throughout 
several texts.
In terms of objectivity and neutrality, I should discuss several items. First, this 
study makes no attempt to present, nor does it intend to imply any moral judgment or 
ethical decision about the veracity or advisability of US-Saudi Policy. Indeed, this study 
acknowledges that the US-Saudi relationship is deeply embedded in issues of national 
security, economic stability, middle-eastern security, global terrorism, high-level 
corruption, deeply-seeded religious sentiment, and world peace. Considering the 
magnitude of these issues in concert with ongoing developments in the geo-political 
community, I do not claim to possess unique knowledge or insight that should qualify me 
to make any such moral or ethical conclusions about US-Saudi policy. Hopefully this 
project will better explain the communicative dimensions of the relationship, allowing 
other scholars to address extended topics in future research.
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Secondly, the historical portion of this project is in no way an exhaustive account 
of US-Saudi relations, Middle Eastern affairs, Wahhabi Islam, the Bush-Saudi family 
connections, or of US policy toward the Middle East. Rather, Chapter II simply attempts 
to describe and appreciate the many dimensions of a complex diplomatic and private 
relationship for the purpose of comparing this history to official rhetoric. There are 
certainly a number of historical, political, and strategic factors that will remain outside 
the scope of public knowledge, and this study makes no attempt to unearth or corroborate 
them. Rather, this study attempts to expand knowledge and understanding of the 
communicative process that enables functional diplomacy. More specifically, this is a 
study of strategic communication in an international setting between national actors, so it 
must observe rhetorical function with a constant eye to history and the circumstances that 
surround diplomatic actors.
Third, as a researcher, I bring to this study a number of assumptions about the 
US-Saudi partnership and the relationship between official rhetoric and extant foreign 
policy. The US-Saudi relationship, contrary to the arguments of detractors, does 
facilitate the U S’s vital interests. Through its supply of foreign oil alone, the Saudi 
Kingdom supports the US economy and the chosen -a lbeit Locke-inspired, lifestyles of 
Americans in ways of which the public is either unaware or unappreciative. Although I 
find it difficult to condone the US’s gluttonous consumption of oil and petroleum 
products, I recognize that the US-Saudi partnership facilitates these fundamental needs of 
US citizens. Until demand drops, supply must court its rise; and hence, the US-Saudi 
partnership continues to be justified as a necessity to the US’s vital energy interests.
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To make a judgment about the relationship’s political advisability is equally 
troublesome. On one hand, critics point out that the US-Saudi relationship is doomed 
because of US troops stationed on Muslim holy land. This issue continues to motivate 
acts of terrorism against US and Western targets across the globe. The rise of Wahhabist 
Islam in Saudi Arabia and the US compounds this dilemma. Additionally, some regional 
experts have argued that the Saudi Kingdom is ripe for regime change and will soon fall 
taking with it the US’s greatly-valued oil supply. For these and other reasons, detractors 
would argue that the US-Saudi policy is politically inadvisable because it broaches on a 
risk to national security.
On the other hand, proponents will argue that so long as US energy needs 
predicate a close military and diplomatic relationship with the Saudis, the White House 
must continue a pro-Saudi policy. They would argue that a pro US-Saudi policy is 
advisable for two primary reasons. First and foremost, the US needs Saudi Oil.
Secondly, if a President were to close its relationship with Saudi Arabia, the price of oil 
would skyrocket, and the American public would immediately feel the strain. Moreover, 
if such a move prompted a Saudi reaction that included withdrawing its considerable 
investments from US markets, the results to the US economy could be staggering. For 
these reasons and other reasons, proponents would hold that US-Saudi policy is 
politically advisable in the face of daunting alternative courses of action.
I also assume that White House rhetoric will, and should, support extant foreign 
policy. Although certain policies will always receive criticism for moral, political, or 
other reasons, this should never preclude officials from supporting the President’s 
policies. I do not believe that all policies deserve public justification, but for the
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purposes of a rhetorical analysis, I assume as a matter of organizational reality that White 
House rhetorical strategy is designed to promote and legitimate the will of the President 
for better or worse.
Lastly, I should outline my position that White House rhetoric is both intentional 
and unintentional. As discussed in further detail in Chapter III, I assume that White 
House rhetoric is strategic insofar as it is designed with a clear purpose, directed at 
particular audiences, and contains appeals and forms designed to persuade. At the same 
time, I understand that language and values are inextricably linked; the President’s 
rhetoric may unintentionally reflect his or her worldviews, ideology, and political or 
social values. This combination of strategy and worldview creates a rhetorical situation 
in which the critic must focus on the function of rhetoric rather than attempting to access 
the rhetor’s motives. Hence, this study will not examine the psychologies of George W. 
Bush and other White House officials, as it focuses on the functions of their rhetoric in a 
given historical context.
In terms of chapter structure, Chapter II begins the historical overview of US- 
Saudi relations, which covers the relationship’s emergence in the 1920s and 30s through 
its dynamic stages of development in the 1970s, through the late 1990s and into the 
September 11th period. Chapter III, the rhetorical analysis, examines the two major 
rhetorical strategies apparent in White House rhetoric during and after the Crawford 
address of April 25, 2002. Chapter IV contains the discussion and conclusion section of 
the study, where I outline the results of the study, its implications in terms of rhetorical 
theory, and finally, a recommendation for current and future White House 
communication strategy.
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II Historical overview of US-Saudi relations
This chapter describes the major periods and events in US-Saudi relations. First, 
the majority of the chapter will review the major periods of interaction between the US 
and Saudi governments, arguing that an economic and military partnership emerged in 
response to the changing needs of both nations as well as the ongoing forces of history. 
The latter portion of this chapter will focus on the financial and political relationships that 
connect the Bush family and the Saudi Royal family. There, I will argue that the 
relationship involved lucrative Saudi investments in US markets that allowed the Saudis 
unique access to Washington power brokers. Finally, I will conclude the chapter with a 
discussion of some major themes found in the historical overview that inform the 
rhetorical analysis in the following chapter. First, however, it is important to gain an 
understanding of the overall rhetorical situation to answer my first research question, 
which is: how does official rhetoric relate to the overall historical context of US-Saudi 
relations.
To summarize, the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia gained 
prominence with the decline of British influence in the Middle East in the late 1920s 
(Klieman, 1970). Soon after, oil was discovered by an American oil company in the 
Saudi desert. During World War II, the US came to rely upon the Saudis for oil, and they 
in turn relied upon the US for regional security needs. From there, these two pinnacle 
issues -economics and security, would expand over decades.
By the beginning of the 21st century, the Saudis were an economic and strategic 
partner for the US. Defined by major events during different decades spanning several 
US Presidential administrations, the relationship has both endured and reshaped history in
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many ways. During each period of time the US responded to several major regional and 
global events by rethinking its relationship with the Saudi Kingdom and how to best 
achieve its regional objectives through this partnership. For example, Washington was 
forced to reconsider its position in the Arab world after the 1973 oil embargo, when Arab 
states eliminated their supply of oil to the west. Tied to the US’s support for Israel, the 
OPEC embargo made the US rethink how it accomplished its regional goals of balancing 
support for Israel with its demand for Arab oil (Quandt, 1987).
Below is an outline of this dynamic relationship, categorized by time period. 
Within each time period, this study notes events that had some guiding influence on the 
US-Saudi alliance. Although I will not attempt to establish causal relationships between 
certain historical factors, I will attempt to describe developments in the relationship that, 
on the surface, seem to illustrate the direction, interests, or other fundamental 
characteristics of the relationship. For the purposes of this study, I will assume “key 
events” to constitute developments that implicate the U S’s vital interests, such as oil 
supply, protecting Israel, or maintaining stability and security in either the Middle-East, 
globally, or within US borders.
In covering the relationship, I have attempted to be as descriptive as possible, as I 
depict the major significant events of the relationship. By way of illustration, I avoid a 
comprehensive account of relevant history, which would prove far too demanding.
Indeed, the US-Saudi partnership played a role in the growth of Western industrialism, 
every major military conflict since World War II, and the emergence of the GOP, OPEC, 
world energy markets, and global terrorism. Covering each of these topics in detail is 
much too cumbersome and unnecessary for this project. Instead, I have attempted to
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focus on the most salient events and developments that predicated and impacted the 
relationship, beginning first and foremost, with the discovery of crude oil in the Arabian 
peninsula.
Before discussing the major developments in US-Saudi relations over the past 80 
years, a brief overview illustrates the pattern of continual growth this relationship 
experienced. Between the 1920s and 60s, the relationship between the two countries 
emerged slowly, as the US cultivated a relationship in which it gained a valuable supply 
of oil in exchange for providing regional security to the newly-formed Saudi Kingdom.
In the 1970s, the economic and military aspects of the partnership grew in response to 
several regional and global developments. Highlighted by the Cold War and a looming 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the 1980s saw the US-Saudi relationship deepen through 
several clandestine military efforts along with rapid economic development. The 1990s, 
notable for the Iraq war, growing Arab anti-westemism, and rising concerns over Osama 
bin Laden, showed both the US and its partner the increasing strategic value of Saudi 
soil. In the pre-September 11th period, the relationship, or at least the US side, remained 
focused on the growing threat of terrorism and the hunt for Osama bin Laden, which 
greatly concerned US policy makers. There was also a less formal component to the US- 
Saudi relationship that related exclusively to the Bushes, who had close ties to the house 
of Saud. Together, each of these aspects creates an impression of rapid economic, 
strategic, and political growth over the several decades of this diplomatic relationship.
All of this dynamic development, however, started with the decline of British 
Imperialism and the discovery of oil on the Eastern Coast of the Arabian peninsula.
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1920s -1960s: the Formative Years
The 1920s and 30s were the formative years of the US-Saudi relationship. In an 
era when the US was seeking foreign oil supplies and the Saudi Arabian theocratic 
monarchy sought military support from a strong ally, the relationship molded around 
these two fundamental issues: energy supply and regional security. In this period, the 
US-Saudi alliance grew around these two strategic and economic imperatives -the  two 
interests that still base the relationship today.
From the 1920s to the late 1930s, both the British and American governments had 
jockeyed for position in the Middle East (Coll, 2004; Klieman, 1970). The growing 
industrial shape of both British and American societies enhanced their necessity for oil 
sources. With the decline of British influence in the emerging Saudi State, and handful 
of US actors such as oil investors, explorers, and government diplomats courted the 
Saudis to create a partnership whereby the US could retrieve oil from the vast desert 
landscape and would allow the Saudis to profit considerably (Coll, 2005; Klieman, 1970).
For the US, the promise of oil solidified in Saudi Arabia on New Year’s Day in 
1938, at an oil well named “Number Seven,” in the desert location of Damman near the 
eastern coast of Saudi-Arabia (Unger, 2004, Appx. B; Baer, 2003, 74). It was there that 
Standard Oil of California, otherwise known as SOCAL, drilled its first successful well 
and thereby secured its ability to extract oil from the vast Saudi landscape (2003, 74).
This single well would produce over 100,000 barrels in its first two months of operation 
(Schwartz, 2003, 124). Owned by John D. Rockefeller, Standard Oil, who owned 
SOCAL, had signed an exploration contract with the Saudi Government that placed it in a 
position unlike any it had ever fathomed (Baer, 76-77). The contract, signed in King Ibn
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Saud’s behalf by his finance minister in 1933, guaranteed Saudi Arabia lucrative 
payments in exchange for the “exclusive r ig h t... to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, 
treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away, and export” oil products from 
underneath Saudi soil (2003, 76). Offering the Saudis an initial loan, annual rent, and 
additional continuing payments upon the discovery of oil, the American company was 
promising a sum which today would total over 4.16 million US Dollars (2003, 76).
The Saudi family, whose theocratic monarchy had taken form only years before, 
was now being offered more money than it had ever seen or even fathomed. In fact, just 
several years earlier, the Saudi finance minister had carried the entire nation’s treasury 
around in a small suitcase, in which he deposited the country’s tax revenue from local 
farmers, traders, and merchants in exchange for a hand-written receipt of credit (Baer, 
2003, 76). But public finance systems would be the least of the Royal family’s concerns 
in the following decades, when its relationship with the west would flourish, offering 
them more high-level attention from American politicians and policy-makers.
Following the initial profit the country made from oil sales to the west, the 1940s 
marked Saudia Arabia’s initial entry into the sphere of international politics, as Great 
Britain and the United States competed for Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves and strategic 
location (Baer 2003, 76-77; Unger, 2004, 3; Crile, 2003). In 1944, a Japanese invasion of 
Burma and Indonesia closed two key oil sources for the US, boosting Saudi Arabia’s 
importance to the West (Baer, 2003, 77). The US drastically increased its diplomatic 
efforts toward the Saudis and offered an aid package which totaled nearly $100 million 
(Baer, 2003, 78). This was an attractive offer to Saudi Arabia, which needed a western 
partner to secure its safety within the region and was worried about Britain’s imperialistic
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tendencies when considering its post-war position (Baer, 2003, 81). The US quickly 
capitalized on this need, and in 1945 offered Saudi Arabia an oil-for-security deal 
whereby the US helped Saudi-Arabia’s regional security needs if the Saudis agreed to 
maintain their supply of oil to the United States (Unger, 289; Baer, 2003, 81-84; Crile, 
2003).
This deal culminated in a secret meeting between the President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz aboard the USS Quincy over Valentine’s Day of 1945, 
when the two countries cemented their interests in a military-economic pact that secured 
a trade of oil supply to the west in exchange for a guarantee of US military support within 
the region (Unger, 2004; Baer, 2003; Crile, 2003, 238).
By 1945, US and Allied forces had nearly tripled their consumption of Saudi 
crude as its yearly output reached 21.3 million barrels just several years after its first oil 
well had appeared (Baer, 2003, 77). By then, the US-Saudi relationship clearly took on 
significant economic and strategic characteristics; the US maintained a steady demand for 
oil, and the Saudis began to depend upon the US for regional security. The following 
period between 1945 and the mid-1950s would be characterized by massive oil purchases 
from US oil companies who would stockpile vast domestic reserves, hoping to meet 
growing US demand with foreign supply. The stockpiling trend would characterize US- 
Saudi relations through the next decade, until 1960, when the Eisenhower 
Administration’s clamp on oil imports would offset this profitable trajectory. (2003, 77, 
79,86-87)
The Saudi position in this relationship would gain great leverage however, with 
the creation of OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, in 1960.
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An oil cartel comprised of the major Arab oil producing countries of the Middle East, 
OPEC greatly increased its members’ bargaining power with the West (86-87). This 
power allowed member countries like Saudi Arabia to control the amount of oil they sent 
to the West, and in an event that impacted the United States’ economy and foreign policy 
position, they fully exercised this authority years later in the oil embargo of 1973.
1970s: Oil supply, global strategy, and bi-lateral cooperation
The 1970s both deepened and complicated the US-Saudi relationship. The 
economic and strategic interests upon which the partnership was founded began to bring 
unforeseen risks to the US both in terms of its energy supply as well as its strategic 
position within the Arab region. More specifically, the 1970s marked several regional 
developments that moved the two countries toward greater interdependence. As 
discussed in this section, a rise in terrorist threats, an Arab attack on Israel in 1973, a 
debilitating oil embargo shortly thereafter, and a looming Soviet presence broadened both 
the economic and military dimensions of the US-Saudi alliance. Perhaps for these 
reasons, the United States deepened its ties to Saudi Arabia by rapidly modernizing the 
Saudi economy and military.
Rapid Modernization
On the economic front, US domestic oil production plateaued in 1970, yet its 
heavy domestic consumption of petrol-products was continuing to increase, which some 
policy analysts argued placed the US in a vulnerable economic position (Quandt, 1987).
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Although evidence suggests conservative voices heard at institutions like Brookings 
supported this notion of vulnerability, others have raised questions about its validity. 
Recent scholarship, such as works by Rocky Mountain Institute founders Hunter and 
Amory Lovins make a different argument. In a 2001 Foreign Affairs essay, these 
analysts argued that the ‘vulnerability’ thesis is primarily the result of a one-sided supply- 
side approach (Lovins & Lovins, 2001). They point to successful demand-side solutions 
like those implemented by President Carter to reduce US dependence on Arab oil (2001). 
Following the Carter Administration’s demand-side efforts at fuel efficiency and 
alternative energy, as well as differences of opinion over the level of US vulnerability to 
oil shock, both sides agree that the US’s reliance on Arab oil production began to have 
more serious implications for policy makers (Lovins & Lovins, 2001; Quandt, 1981). The 
US’s energy and security needs would increasingly overlap with its interests in the 
region.
On the military front, US support for Israel began to provoke a dramatic response 
from the Arab world. As the US would realize in 1973, its support for Israel following 
the Six Day War in 1967 would provoke tremendous backlash from the Arab world in a 
way the US had never anticipated. In fact, three major inter-related developments —the 
Yom Kippur war, the 1973 oil embargo, and the rise of fundamentalist terror 
organizations, would add to a list of US concerns about Middle-East strategy and regional 
security (Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003).
The Saudi Kingdom was an unlikely partner; beyond its ability to supply oil to the 
west and facilitate a US defensive presence when in need, the Kingdom might not present 
itself as a pinnacle priority of US foreign policy. Described by many authors as
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backward, undeveloped, and deeply attached to a rigid interpretation of Islam, Saudi 
society was still barely emerging from a vast landscape still widely inhabited by nomadic 
tribes and clustered villages (Baer, 2004; Schwartz, 2003; Crile, 2003). In fact, despite 
the Royal family’s immense wealth, by 1974, the Saudi Government was still using goats 
as a trash removal system on city and village streets (Perkins, 2004, 81). Like the State’s 
belief that its royal subjects should not have to pick up trash, the rulers followed what one 
author called “puritanical idealism;” women were still required to be fully covered; 
religious police enforced 5 daily prayer obligations; public executions, be-headings, and 
stonings are common practice (2004, 81-82). Even today, public beheadings continue in 
the frequently-noted plaza affectionately referred to as “Chop-Chop Square” (Baer, 2003; 
Perkins, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). Yet despite the fact that Saudi society did not fit the 
image of a “first world” partner to the west, some policy experts saw Saudi 
“backwardness” as an opportunity for rapid modernization and a closer relationship with 
the US (Wells, 1976; Quandt, 1981; Perkins, 2004). In fact, a major “oil shock” would 
quickly re-cast the US’s interests in aligning itself even closer to this seemingly 
backward nation.
Many remember the Oil Embargo of 1973. With US domestic oil production 
peaking its capacity in 1970, the stage was set for the second major event in US-Saudi 
relations when US oil imports, to the disadvantage of the Saudis, had greatly diminished 
as a result of oil-import restrictions imposed under the Eisenhower administration 
(Unger, 2004, 289; Baer, 2003, 86-87). With their sales to the west waning, the Saudis 
were about to get a chance to drastically improve their advantage by completely cutting- 
off the flow of oil to the US.
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On October 6, 1973, a sacred Jewish holiday, Egypt and Syria launched 
simultaneous attacks on Israel which initiated what is now called the Yom Kippur war.
In addition, to counter the US’s strong support for Israel, the six major Arab oil 
producers, including Saudi Arabia, announced a 70 percent increase in oil prices on 
October 16, just ten days later. The cartel pledged to individually cut their supplies to the 
west by 5 and even 10 percent. Despite this paralyzing embargo, on October 19,
President Nixon proposed that the US Congress continue to provide another $2.2 billion 
in extra aid to Israel on Oct. 19, which prompted a more extreme response from the 
Saudis and OPEC: a complete Arab embargo, cutting off all oil shipments to the US. 
(Perkins, 2004, 82-83)
This embargo imposed a major shock on US markets, crippling the US economy. 
OPEC and Saudi Arabia in particular now exerted tremendous international leverage. 
OPEC’s drastic supply cuts however, were not nearly as devastating as the Saudi decision 
to additionally reduce future production quotas (Quandt, 1981, 128). As Brookings 
analyst William Quandt explained, the extra cut in production created “circumstances that 
led to a doubling in the posted price of oil” (1981, 128). As regional expert Robert Baer 
put it, the Saudis realized that “Suddenly, the petrodollar spigot acquired new dimensions 
-you could open it up to make money, or close it off to make even more” (2003, 87). 
Indeed, they did, as oil prices skyrocketed. Between 1970 and 1974, Saudi oil jumped 
from $1.39 a barrel to $8.32 per barrel (Perkins, 2004, 83).
In terms of US-Saudi relations, the embargo represented a moment when Saudi 
Arabia would rapidly expand its geo-political influence as a result of US dependency.
The consequences of the Yom Kippur war, the following oil embargo, and the surge of
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Arab oil profits (from 1973-1974, OPEC earnings jumped from $30 -$105 billion) 
completely recast the nature of Saudi influence with the US (Wells, 1976, 1; Quandt, 
1981).
The US could have responded in a number of ways. On one hand, the US might 
have punished the Saudis for what some could argue was a betrayal of the partnership. 
Other accounts however, describe the US’s attempts to deepen the economic dimensions 
of the relationship, in effect drawing itself closer with this apparently unpredictable ally 
(Quandt, 1981; Perkins, 2004). In an apparently bold and rapid development strategy, the 
US responded to the oil embargo by rapidly modernizing the Saudi infrastructure, 
becoming even closer with the Saudi regime. Through both military cooperation and 
economic development the partnership would deepen and gain new complexities.
On the financial front, US economists were concerned with preventing future oil
crises and began to assess the potential for Saudi Arabia to experience rapid economic
development, in which the US might play a pivotal and profitable role (Perkins, 2004,
81). The US also pursued a new strategy shortly after the oil embargo which aimed at
exploiting the profits of major Arab oil producers and returning those profits to US
markets (2004, 83-84). One facet of this strategy, for example, entailed Saudi approval
for major spending on infrastructure and military development. Hailed as a landmark
success in international development, the rapid modernization of the Saudi state involved
huge projects including:
-Constructing electrical generators 
-Major energy transmission and distribution lines 
-Water, sewage, and other pipelines 
-new communication networks systems 
-transportation systems including major highways 
-new airports and improved sea ports
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-large array of service and retail industries 
-supporting infrastructure for these services 
(Perkins, 2004, 85-86)
In awarding contracts, the Saudis agreed to rely exclusively upon US contractors for 
these gigantic projects (2004, 83-84). As mentioned above, the US was trying to transfer 
Saudi oil profits back into US markets; by creating a situation in which the Saudis were 
paying lucrative contracts to US firms, the US achieved this end but not without some 
unique arrangements.
Facilitating this strategy, the US Dept, of Treasury created JECOR, the Saudi 
Arabian Joint Economic Commission, whose primary function was to use Saudi 
development funds to hire American engineering and construction companies (Perkins, 
2004, 84). Ultimately, with no congressional oversight, JECOR spent billions of Saudi 
Oil money on lucrative contracts, which effectively transferred these billions into US 
markets (2004, 84-85). It is unclear why the operation lacked congressional monitoring, 
but this feature of the project allowed greater flexibility in terms of administrative 
discretion (2004). Commonly referred to as the Saudi money-laundering affair, the 
arrangement was a target for many critics of the US-Saudi relationship and continues to 
cause disagreement among experts (2004, 97-98). Perkins (2004), who worked closely 
with JECOR during this period, was highly critical of the project and described the US’s 
goals as an attempt to render the Saudi economy “increasingly intertwined with and 
dependent upon ours” (2004, 85). Although plausible, this account is balanced by W ells’ 
(1976) analysis, where he offered the following assessment of the Saudi development 
strategy:
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The increase in the export earnings of [OPEC] ... is one of those rare historical 
events that fundamentally alter economic and political relationships among 
nations and groups of nations. It is inevitable and desirable that these events be 
followed by evaluations of their political and economic consequences... (1976, 1)
He suggests that despite the motivations behind JECOR’s activities, the US’s intent to 
return profits to its own firms inevitably arose from OPEC’s rapid profit gains. While 
critics and proponents disagree about whether JECOR’s operations were either inevitable 
or opportunistic by design, they both agree that the rapid development of Saudi 
infrastructure widened the economic dimension of the relationship. Between 1976 and 
1980, Saudi exports to the US would spike from $1.9-12.9 billion dollars (1976, 162). 
The stage was set for an era in which the complicated relationship of these two countries 
would deepen financially. This period, as mentioned above, also deepened their 
geostrategic relationship..
Military and Strategic Development
On the military front, the Saudis became more involved in covert actions within 
their region on behalf of US interests, much to the potential dismay of both Arab and 
Western publics (Coll, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). With growing unrest in the region, the US 
became a more integral strategic partner for the Saudis, while simultaneously creating 
new opportunities for US influence within the region.
The US was dealing with a new global enemy: terrorism aimed at its foreign 
interests. In Saudi Arabia, a number of armed uprisings, bombings, and a general trend of 
internal resistance continued to threaten both US and Saudi targets (Coll, 2004). These 
threats existed outside of the Saudi borders as well. In 1970, the Palestine Liberation
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Organization (PLO) hijacked over 300 passengers aboard civilian airliners in Amman, 
Jordan. Captivating the global media, these terrorists held the hostages for a week, and 
then released them, shortly thereafter blowing-up the aircraft for the world to see 
(Landlau & Landlau, 2002). Two years later, Islamic terrorist groups made an even 
higher-profile hijacking at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, when members of the 
Black September group held a team of Israeli athletes hostage and later murdered them 
(Landlau & Landlau, 2002). Over the decade, these events would become foreground for 
a larger trend of kidnappings, assassinations, embassy bombings, and hijackings that 
forced the US to create new strategies for defending against this threat (Baer, 2002; Crile, 
2003).
Without surprise, during the coming decades the primary constraint on US-Saudi 
relations would be a concern over US involvement with an increasingly unstable and 
unpredictable region -one that, in the context of global media, had become the face 
associated with world terrorist organizations. The numerous future conflicts surrounding 
US-Saudi relations would stem from this general principle.
During the 1970s however, the culmination of America’s growing dependence on 
Saudi oil and the rapid rise of hostile acts from Islamic terrorist groups gave both the 
public and its policy-makers much to fret over. By this time, Saudi Arabia, as one of the 
US’s primary regional energy suppliers, could be undercut by Islamic radicals who 
threatened the internal-stability of oil-producing countries. Groups like the Islamic Jihad, 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Palestinian Liberation Organization, and others would 
launch sporadic attacks on US targets (Baer, 2002; 2003; Crile, 2003; Landlau &
Landlau, 2002). This development, along with the looming Cold War with the Soviets,
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led many in the US policy-making community to believe that the only solution to 
growing regional threats was a strengthened military presence in the Middle East, Saudi 
Arabia in particular (Clarke, 2004, 37-39; Crile, 2003).
The US military took several measures to address the problem. Aside from 
deepening its clandestine operations with Saudi Arabia, it began re-engineering many of 
its operational capabilities. For example, the Pentagon greatly expanded the scope of its 
Special Operations (SPECOPS) capabilities to include new units in each branch of the 
military to counter the loosely-organized non-conventional armies of terrorist 
organizations (Landlau & Landlau, 2002). The Navy’s Special Warfare Command, for 
example, created a Sixth SEAL team in part to respond to globally-diffused terrorist 
organizations, and the ultra-secret DELTA team, about which little is found in the 
mainstream media, was created with a similar design: operational versatility, global 
deployability, and highly-specialized personnel with distinguished combat experience 
(2002, 167, 276). Although the emergence of SEAL teams originated in their historical 
maturation from WWII navy “Frogmen” into remarkably effective hit-and-run operatives 
in the Vietnam conflict, these formerly underwater demolition crews developed startling 
new capabilities in their adaptations to the unconventional behaviors of terrorist groups 
(2002). Yet while the military was addressing strategic threats, other efforts were 
underway to get better grasp of the religious sources of fundamentalist terror 
organizations.
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism had strong implications for US-Saudi 
diplomatic relations. The Saudi government was the secular component of a larger 
regime which included the Wahhabi version of Islam as its religious foundation, a rigid
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interpretation of the Islamic religion that undergirded the nation’s founding in much the 
same way that democratic thinking pervaded the founding of the US and creation of its 
constitution (Schwartz, 2003). The two are permanent partners. In fact, at the Saudi 
nation’s founding, the families of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and A1 Sa’ud made several actions 
to establish the Wahhabi family as the religious authority of the state, while the family of 
A1 Sa’ud would carry the state’s political rule (Schwartz, 2003, 82; Unger, 2004). They 
consecrated this agreement by inter-marrying the two families and thus establishing a 
theocratic monarchy whereby the church and state would become one in the same 
(Schwartz, 2003, 82). By permanently establishing Wahhabi Islam as its national creed, 
the Saudi government eventually faced decades of overt resistance and challenges from 
other sectors of the Arab and Islamic world who strongly detested the Wahhabi religion 
(Schwartz, 2003). The country’s domestic stability as well as its perceived legitimacy 
among other Arab populations would continue to balance on this controversial theology.
The Wahhabi strand of Islam, to which Osama bin Laden subscribes, has been 
described as rigid and extreme (Rashid, 2003). The clan gained its early influence largely 
through violence and cruelty to other more moderate Islamic sects and also with the help 
of British aide (Klieman, 1970). During their expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
Wahhabis embarked on a bloody campaign to rid the region of other tribes. In 1802, for 
example, the Wahhabis surrounded the westem-Arabian city of Ta’if, and despite the 
city’s surrender, commenced with killing every man, woman, and child in the city, and 
further desecrating its Mosques, until the inhabitants were exterminated (Schwartz,
2003).
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This type of cruelty gained the Wahhabis much hatred in the Arab world, 
primarily because of its religious motivation, exemplified in the clan’s frequent 
destruction and desecration of sacred grounds like the tombs of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
wives and other family members (Schwartz, 2003). These and many other departures 
from traditional Islam have made the Wahhabi clan highly controversial in the Muslim 
world. Osama bin Laden, for example, was a major outspoken critic of the Saudi regime 
before his exile (Schwartz, 2004; Clarke, 2004). Angered at a range of issues including 
both US support for Israel, and the more recent presence of ‘infidel’ troops in Saudi holy 
land —Muslim holy cites in particular, bin Laden’s revolutionary development in many 
ways rooted itself in these two issues (Schwartz, 2004; Clarke, 2004). Together with his 
growing appeal during this time period, bin Laden was emblematic of a fringe sentiment 
in the Arab world; indeed, he is still celebrated among many Muslims (Schwartz, 2004; 
Coll, 2004).
In recent times, this controversial sentiment appears in hostility toward the Saudi 
regime, which has led many experts to question its long-term legitimacy and stability 
(Baer, 2003; Unger, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). In terms of its military alliance, US-Saudi 
concerns over the tandem rise of fundamentalism and terrorism brought a difficult 
question to the forefront of US policy concerns: how to improve relations between the 
two countries despite growing anti-westernism in both Saudi Arabia and the greater Arab 
region.
Following the rapid growth the Kingdom experienced with US development 
efforts, from the Saudis grew an increasing concern for internal and regional security 
(Perkins, 2004, 87-88; Coll, 2004). With its Arab and Muslim neighbors beginning to
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resent its friendly relationship with the West, Israel beginning to envy its tremendous 
growth, and the Soviets expanding into Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia sought additional 
military support and training from the US to help solidify its regional position (2004, 87- 
88; Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). To protect against both internal and external threats, the 
Saudis relied upon the US for specialized weapons, facilities, training, and intelligence to 
modernize its military strength (2004, 87-88; Clarke, 2004; Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004; Crile,
2003). So, in the same fashion as the US physically reshaped the Saudi Kingdom with 
rapid infrastructure development, the US simultaneously revolutionized the Saudi 
military.
To summarize, the 1970s showed a continuation of the economic and military 
arrangements that preceded the decade’s major events. However, as a result of several 
key developments, the US greatly expanded both its financial and strategic arrangements 
with Saudi Arabia, which entailed the US’s rapid modernization of the Saudi economy, 
military, and state infrastructure to the benefit of greater regional influence and a more 
secure Saudi state. In turn, both of these achievements would enhance the US’s position 
considerably in the coming decade, when the 80’s presented yet another set of unique 
global developments.
1980s: The Cold War, power balancing, and clandestine surrogacy
As the economic interests of the US and the Saudi Kingdom continued to progress 
the 1980s showed more sensitive and clandestine military cooperation between the two 
countries. The Iran-Iraq war and the bold Soviet attack on Afghanistan provided 
opportunities for the Saudis to play a key role in politically sensitive US military
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operations throughout the Middle-East and Central Asia. The scope of bi-lateral military 
cooperation expanded through increases in covert actions against a number of regional 
dictators, terrorist groups, and the Soviet Union. Discussed below, several key 
developments in world politics provided both the context and the motivation for 
expanding the scope of US-Saudi relations to combat or otherwise undermine the Soviet 
Union’s expansion into Afghanistan and also to influence an increasingly volatile conflict 
in Iran and Iraq (Unger, 2004, 57; Clarke, 2004, 42, 50). In a key communicative 
development, the sensitive nature of this deepened military cooperation also brought a 
more plausible need for secrecy in the relationship.
The Iran-Iraq war escalated by the early 1980s, and left the US in a precarious 
position. Both Iran and Iraq posed significant threats to Israel and Saudi Arabia, which 
were the US’s two primary regional interests. The threat to Israel became a sensitive 
political issue on the domestic front in the US (Crile, 2004). Upon entering office on the 
tails of a landslide presidential victory, the Reagan-Bush administration had publicly 
maintained a hard line against Islamic Fundamentalists, a position that seemed to bolster 
support for Israel (Unger, 2004, 62-63; Crile, 2004). In terms of its threat to the region, 
Iran was considered at the time to pose a potentially hostile threat to Saudi Arabia as well 
(Quandt, 1981). Because Iran could harm both Israeli security and the US’s oil supply 
via Saudi Arabia, the country arguably posed an imminent threat to vital US interests.
But Iran was only one side of the coin. Iraq also posed an arguable threat to US interests. 
Comparably speaking, the both became risks to regional security. (Unger, 2004; Coll, 
2004; Crile, 2003; Hillsman, 1992; Coll, 2004)
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This ambiguous comparison left policy makers in a difficult position. For this and 
probably numerous other reasons, the Reagan administration was fiercely divided over 
the Iran-Iraq war, particularly over the question of covert support: who would receive it, 
Iran or Iraq (Unger, 2004, 62)? On the one hand, Saddam Hussein was a brutal secular 
dictator who posed an arguable threat to the region and Israel in particular, but if armed, 
could threaten harm to Iran and thus defend US interests in Saudi Arabia as a third-party 
covert actor (2004, 62; Hilsman, 1992). On the other hand, some in the Reagan White 
House argued that Ayatollah Komeini’s fundamentalist regime in Iran publicly abhorred 
and threatened to destroy the US, but, if  armed could undermine Hussein’s ability to 
strike Israel or do other damage within the region (2004, p. 62). In one of its most 
controversial decisions of the era, the US decided to secretly arm both Iran and Iraq 
(2004, p. 62-63). It should be noted that despite accounts of mutual support, one regional 
expert directly involved in the affair through his work with the CIA, Robert Baer, 
strongly dismisses this claim, explaining it as a “vintage conspiracy theory that dogged 
everything [CIA] tried in Iraq -  the myth that the US secretly kept Saddam in power” 
(See: 2002, 178).
In 1984, the US allegedly supported Saddam in his war against Iran through 
intelligence sharing and weapons sales (Clarke, 2004, 42, 282). In doing so, however, the 
US enlisted the help of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both of whom apparently acted as a third 
party channels for the operation (2004, 282). According to Craig Unger (2004), the US 
funneled billions in aid and weapons to Hussein’s regime, and decided to rely on third 
party actors to avoid the widespread public condemnation that would have accompanied 
news of this action (59-65). For similar reasons, the operation with Iran was equally
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discrete (2004). Initially, the US armed these countries secretly with the help of outside 
parties like Israel, which funneled billions in arms, ammunition, and other equipment to 
Iran in the early 80s (2004, 63). But after this operation came to light, the US allegedly 
sought another third-party to facilitate ongoing deals of this nature, and that third-party 
was Saudi-Arabia (2004, 62-63). But in asking Saudi-Arabia to help with this covert 
arms supplying, the US also needed the Saudis’ assistance with another, seemingly 
unrelated item: Nicaragua.
At the time, Nicaragua had been defending itself against a group of right-wing 
rebels known as the contras and had become a hot topic for the administration. In fact, 
responding to ongoing debate on the subject, the US Congress in 1982 voted 
unanimously (411 to 0) against providing any US support for the contra rebels and the 
overthrow of the Nicaraguan government in what was called the Boland Amendment 
(Unger, 2004, 63, 65). During the course of events later called the Iran-Contra affair, and 
flagrantly in the face of numerous decisions, public statements, and laws dictating the 
contrary, the US used Prince Bandar and other Saudi intelligence officials as conduits for 
indirect funding of Iraq, Iran, and the anti-leftist Contra rebels of Nicaragua (2004, 62-64; 
Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). In doing so, the Saudis gained both initially, with a White 
House-approved secret delivery of 400 Stinger missiles to the Saudi government, and 
later on through greatly improved relations with the US (2004, 65).
By the mid 1980s the Saudis had become a key partner in the US’s Middle East 
operations and stood to both gain and suffer from it. From the American perspective, one 
could argue that its controversial power-balance proved remarkably successful. Playing 
two enemies against each other allowed the US to leverage considerable force in the
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region. Some have also speculated that the US benefited economically from the decision. 
According to one economist, escalating war between these two key oil producers drove 
down the price of Arab oil during the period (Quandt, 1988, 46). Beyond this speculative 
account, the Iran-Iraq dilemma was only one facet of the US’s position in the region.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed an imminent threat to US interests in 
the region. Although somewhat distant to the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan’s position was 
close enough to US oil interests that the US intelligence community worried about the 
Soviets projecting power into the region from Afghanistan in the same manner they 
influenced Central Europe through the former Eastern Block (Coll, 2004, 42-43; Crile,
2003). The event also heightened Arab fears of Soviet expansion, and also reinforced the 
value of US military support (2004; 2003). Shortly after the Afghan incursion, President 
Carter established what historians call the “Carter doctrine” whereby he agreed to defend 
Saudi Arabia and neighboring United Arab Emirates against foreign attack (Hilsman, 
1992, 29; Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). This effort would eventually entail closer cooperation 
including intelligence sharing, clandestine operational support, and funding with both 
Saudi and Pakistani agencies (Coll, 2004, 44-45; Crile, 2003). By partnering with the 
US in its fight against the “Evil Empire’s” Central-Eurasian expansion, the Saudis 
offered the US a rare and invaluable strategic partnership becoming a key staging point in 
the clandestine proxy-war (Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). There was only one problem; the 
presence of western troops on the soil that surrounds holy cites like Mecca and Medina 
was highly controversial for Muslims because it violates scripture (Schwartz, 2003; Coll,
2004). Hence, the US hand in Afghanistan was a very sensitive issue for a number of 
reasons, religious and strategic topping the list; for this reason, it remained invisible
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(Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). Here is where one sees the developing need for secrecy in the 
relationship. Because of the sensitive nature of US-Saudi involvement, it seemed more 
plausible that withholding information about the true on-goings of the relationship made 
sense for reasons of national security.
During the Afghan wars, the US also asked Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and Pakistan to help recruit an Arab army to support Afghanistan’s fight against the 
Soviets (Clarke, 2004, 52; Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). The Saudis led this effort in 
assembling volunteers, and in doing so selected Osama bin Laden, son of the billionaire 
Saudi construction family, the Bin Ladens -a  family who was and is very close to the 
royal family (Unger, 2004, 52; Coll, 2004). Bin Laden’s key directive was to recruit, 
transport, arm, train, and indoctrinate Arab volunteers and send them to train and fight in 
Afghanistan (2004, 52; Coll, 2004). This effort proved a remarkably effective, as many 
young Muslims eagerly joined to defend the Arab world against this atheist threat of 
communism.
The US’s primary goal in this effort was to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan 
(Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). However, fearing high-scale retaliation from the Soviets, the 
US maintained only an invisible hand in the conflict, a principle that necessitated the use 
of Pakistani soil as an operational staging point (2004,44-45; Crile, 2003). In a dramatic 
display of US support for the Mujahideen, Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson donated a 
pint of his own blood during a visit to an afghan refugee camp in Pakistan (2003, 191). 
The support was not merely symbolic. During the period, the US constructed several 
bases for stockpiling weapons and supplies, and also funneled third-party funding to the 
Afghan fighters through various Saudi and Pakistani charities and religious organizations
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(Clarke, 2004, 50; Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). Illustrating the level of financial support 
from Washington, by 1987, funding for the anti-Soviet covert action program had jumped 
from $35 million in 1982 to $600 million (Clarke, 2004, 50). As the Soviet Union fell, 
many considered this funding well-justified, as many of the battles against the Soviets 
were fought through well-funded non-conventional proxy wars within Eastern Europe, 
Central Asia, South America, and elsewhere.
To summarize, the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, and even Nicaragua all 
illustrated the growth in US-Saudi strategic cooperation. From an overview of this 
period, one sees how the Saudis were becoming a versatile partner in the US’s 
clandestine operations in the Middle-East and Central Asia. These efforts also supported 
the economic interests of the relationship insofar as military support facilitated a more 
secure and stable supply of oil. Because of the discrete and clandestine nature of these 
operations, the relationship necessitated an even greater need for secrecy. In the end, 
however, the 1980s again paved the way for greater mutual dependence between the two 
countries both economically and militarily.
1990s: Iraq, Osama bin Laden, and Growing Anti-Western Sentiment
The central event that shaped the US-Saudi relationship in the 1990s was the US’s 
incursion into Iraq on behalf of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This event not only evinced a 
situation in which the US was willing to commit troops to a hostile region to defend its 
regional interests on behalf of the Saudis, the war also created circumstances in which 
Saudi Arabia conceded to allow a permanent presence of US troops in Mecca and 
Medina. Discussed below, these two outcomes of the Iraq war were the most defining
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because of their timely coincidence with the rise of Muslim terrorism, Arab Anti-
westernism, and the growing threat of Osama bin Laden.
As the 1990s began, a US invasion of Iraq loomed in the minds of policy makers.
Although a number of international scholars and political scientists have examined the
various causes and outcomes of the Gulf War (Baram & Rubin, 1993; Pelletiere, 2001;
Salinger, 1991; Yetiv, 1997; Smith, 1992; Wilson, 2005), this chapter’s analysis of the
conflict will focus on the war’s impact on the US-Saudi partnership. The US incursion
into Iraq on behalf of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had key implications on its relations with
the Saudis (Wilson, 2005). Leading to a permanent presence of US troops in the
Kingdom, the first Gulf War enhanced 1) the strategic importance of Saudi soil, 2) the
US military presence in the region, and 3) growing uneasiness and domestic unrest within
the Arab world and inside Saudi Arabia over US military presence in Muslim Holy land.
The war escalated after several diplomatic moves by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. In
1990, following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam made several requests of his
neighbors, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to help him recover from
the costly war (Hilsman, 1992, 41-42). Reasoning that he was defending the entire gulf
region against an imminent Iranian threat, he made several requests to help balance out
the costs of post-war reconstruction:
-Forgive all outstanding debt, and offer $30 billion in new loans 
-Kuwait, which allegedly stole Iraqi Oil, must pay $2.4 billion 
-Emirates must stop violating strict OPEC quotas for oil output 
-OPEC must raise the price of oil (1992, 41-42)
The Saudis, along with their neighbors, refused these requests (1992, 42). This was one
of many circumstances that eventually instigated Saddam’s increasingly aggressive
behavior within the region. Saddam threatened attacks on both Saudi Arabia and Israel -
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the US’s two main regional interests; the US responded that it would react “vigorously” 
in such a case (1992, 76). Fearing estimates that damaged Saudi oil fields could spike 
domestic oil prices from under $20 dollars to nearly $70 a barrel, the US had an 
imperative to protect Saudi oil fields from Iraqi bombings (1992, 59). As war became an 
imminent threat, King Fahd granted US permission to station over 425,000 troops in 
Saudi Arabia; shortly thereafter Bush sent ground, naval, and air units to the region 
(1992, 1, 96). In the end, Saddam attacked his neighbor, Kuwait, which allegedly was 
diagonally-drilling for oil under Iraqi soil (1992,42). Soon thereafter, the US declared 
war against Saddam after his refusal to leave Kuwait.
At the outset of the invasion, President Bush outlined his 3 primary goals of the 
Iraqi incursion: first, defend Saudi Arabia; second, force Iraq out of Kuwait; and third, 
send a punitive message to Saddam (Hilsman, 1992, 71). The Saudis, however, remained 
concerned over the presence of US troops on Saudi soil, which violated Islamic principles 
(Clarke, 2004, 59). American B-52s were staging bomb runs on Arab (Iraqi) targets 
from Saudi soil, which was a lasting thorn for many Muslims who hold religious 
sentiment for Iraq despite its ruler and equally oppose the presence of western troops near 
Mecca and Medina (Hilsman, 1992, 115; Schwartz, 2003). Iran’s religious leaders urged 
Muslims to oppose the US troop presence in Saudi Arabia (Hilsman, 1992, 74). That 
same year, Yemen’s President criticized Saudi Arabia for bringing US troops to the 
region (Hilsman, 1992, 86). Aside from religious concerns, Saudis in particular were 
worried about collateral damage from Saddam’s attacks. Iraqi Scuds struck targets in 
Dahram, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 Americans, and wounding over 100 (Hilsman, 1992, 
127). A large number of Scuds were also fired into Riyadh (1992, 97). Beyond
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resentment of US military presence and the fears about collateral damage, the failing state 
of Iraq was another major issue in the region.
By the war’s end, Saddam was left without a formidable army, and the US came 
out victorious. But the post-war scenario was a new concern for policy makers. US 
Secretary of State James Baker introduced a 5-point plan to guide the post-war Iraq, 
which included two items of great significance to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. One 
major point in the Baker plan asserted the need for a permanent US military presence in 
the region, presumably on Saudi soil (Hilsman, 1992, 117). Secondly, the plan also 
called for a significant reduction of US dependence on Middle-Eastern oil, a large 
measure of which was currently supplied by the Saudis (1992, 117). With the Saudis 
becoming increasingly crucial to the U S’s strategic position in a volatile region, the 
1990s would demonstrate a rising rate of Arab disapproval of the US presence in the 
Saudi Kingdom, and of the relationship in general (Clarke, 2004, 62; Schwartz, 2003). In 
1991, as post-war peace plans developed, the many Saudi leaders expressed disagreement 
with a permanent US military presence in the region, for which US negotiators in turn 
continued to press (Hilsman, 1992, 93).
There was, however, another lasting implication of the Iraq war on US-Saudi 
relations. By holding back on Saddam, the US let him gain strength, which also seemed 
to necessitate an extended US military presence in Saudi-Arabia to prevent another attack 
against Kuwait (Clarke, 2004, 66). To protect against future attacks from Saddam, the 
Saudis pressed President Bush to begin a significant clandestine military effort to divide 
and undermine Saddam’s military, in 1992; Bush agreed (Hilsman, 1992, p. 248). 
However, the domestic and regional unrest was becoming a serious problem and quickly
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became visible through a series of terrorist attacks aimed at US interests and allies within 
the region. In the early 1990’s terrorists supported by Iran targeted US interests in Saudi 
Arabia. First, in 1995, it bombed a Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh; the second 
major target was a tower of military barracks in Khobar, which brought the total of US 
lives lost to 24 in two major attacks (Baer, 2002, 250).
Dealing with the broad problems associated with these types of carefully-planned 
attacks is difficult for the Saudis even today. According to some analysts, the US’s 
desires for the region were met with uncooperative efforts to capture terrorists within 
Saudi Arabia. As outlined by several regional experts (Baer, 2003, 2004; Clarke, 2004; 
Schwartz, 2003; Coll, 2004), the Saudi royal leadership is greatly divided Over its 
relationship with the West, which undermines any collective attempts at broad reform 
within the Saudi regime. This may explain why, to the dismay of US officials, the Saudis 
were uncooperative when the US sought their help in detaining Hizballah terrorist leader 
Imad Mugmiyah who was flying into a Saudi Airport in 1997 (Clarke, 2004, 153). Many 
similar examples abound in this period (Baer, 2003; Clarke, 2004), but the internal 
division within the Saudi royal family did little to prevent its partnership with the US.
To summarize, the Iraq war brought the US-Saudi alliance to a new level of 
strategic and political involvement. By providing the impetus for both the temporary and 
permanent presence of US troops on Muslim holy land, the Iraq war deepened the level 
of bi-lateral military cooperation beyond any previous decade. Unfortunately for both 
parties, this cooperation would enflame growing Arab hatred of the west which would 
eventually hurt the US just one year after the decade’s end.
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Pre-Sept. 11: Terrorism and the Hunt fo r  Bin Laden
During the months leading up to Sept. 11, 2001, the US’s fight against a growing 
international terrorist threat became the leading focus between the two countries. 
Discussed below, Saudi Arabia’s record in the fight against terror was mixed. Although 
they appeared to cooperate publicly with the US’s efforts to stop the spread of terrorist 
organizations within its borders, much evidence suggested the contrary -that they quietly 
resisted.
By the end of the 1990s senior US policy makers became increasingly fearful of a 
widely growing trend of anti-western and anti-American sentiment in the Middle-East 
(Baer, 2003; Clarke, 2004; Schwartz, 2003; Coll, 2004). Noticing a growing number of 
terrorist attacks on foreign US targets and interests, the Pentagon and the US intelligence 
community increased their efforts at capturing or otherwise stopping the growth of this 
movement (Clarke, 2004; Baer, 2002; Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004). In doing so, the US 
depended upon a wide range of clandestine, diplomatic, and intelligence-sharing projects 
with key partners in the Middle-East like Saudi Arabia (Coll, 2004). In terms of its 
support and cooperation for these activities, the Saudis played a rather ambiguous role in 
the war on terror, and the hunt for bin Laden in particular.
On the one hand, many have argued that the Saudis played a crucial role in 
fighting terrorism in the Middle East. President Bush, for example, has frequently 
applauded the Saudis for condemning terrorism (April 25, 2002; April 25, 2005), and a 
several historians and international scholars have highlighted the Saudi’s exiling of 
Osama bin Laden and its subsequent attempts to subdue al Qaeda attacks within the Saudi 
Kingdom as evidence of its support (Coll, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). The Saudi government
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appeared more motivated to capture bin Laden and other terrorists After the Mecca 
Affair, when the Muslim Brotherhood (with which Osama was closely affiliated) seized 
the Grand Mosque in 1979 (Unger, 2004).
At the same time, however, the Bin Laden family’s close connections with the 
Saudi government, according to one account, made it “ impossible to take strong punitive 
action against him” (Unger, 2004, 96). After all, the bin Laden construction firm was the 
official custodian and engineer of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina; ironically, the bin 
Laden company was rebuilding the Grand Mosque when it was attacked (2004, 95). So 
while the Saudis desperately wished to rid themselves of Osama bin Laden and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, it walked a very delicate line in actually capturing and punishing 
them. This tendency, according to some accounts, lead to half-hearted efforts in Saudi 
cooperation with the US in the war on terror (Baer, 2003; Clarke, 2004).
According to the FBI’s former counter-terrorism Chief, Richard Clarke (2004), 
Saudi cooperation in the war on terror could be described as lethargic, reluctant, and in 
some cases resistant (281). According to Clarke, the US gave Saudis intelligence in three 
areas of concern, to which it received little if any feedback or response:
1) al Qaeda operatives living and operating within Saudi Arabia
2) al Qaeda fundraising and money-laundering in the kingdom
3) The use of Saudi charities to support al Qaeda activities (Clarke, 2004, 281)
Apparently, only after a 2003 al Qaeda truck bombing in Riyadh did the Saudis show any 
considerable effort in providing information to US intelligence agencies (2004, 281). A 
similar example occurred just before the September 11th attacks when former Middle- 
East CIA Officer Robert Baer obtained a list of hundreds of bin Laden operatives who 
were working secretly in the Gulf Region, including Saudi Arabia (Baer, 2002, 270-271).
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After he presented the information to the Saudi Government, they refused to 
acknowledge it, or distribute the information to other Saudi officials and intelligence 
agencies (2002, 271). But while the Saudis appeared unhelpful in capturing and 
investigating terror cells within its borders, they played a key role in pressuring the 
Taliban, rulers of Afghanistan, to give up Osama Bin Laden.
In 2000, for example, the US was trying to get the Taliban to force the closure of 
al Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan (Clarke, 2004, p. 207). The US had “no 
leverage” in negotiating with the Taliban, and perhaps was additionally reluctant to 
arrange formal diplomatic channels with an essentially rogue theocratic government, 
which led Washington to seek several third parties to step-in and appeal to the Taliban on 
its behalf (2004, 208). With the exception of Pakistan, the Saudis were the only major 
regional state that recognized the Taliban as the official governors of Afghanistan 
(Woodward, 2002, 87). Along with Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia 
was a key US surrogate in these negotiations (Clarke, 2004, 208).
Despite an offer of considerable foreign aid, the Saudis pleas for Taliban 
cooperation in removing Bin Laden were rejected (Clarke, 2004, 208). The Saudis did 
end formal diplomatic relations with the Taliban, but continued to send diplomats in an 
attempt to “reason” with the Taliban, whereby Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki 
offered an even larger sum of foreign aid in exchange for Bin Laden’s extradition; again 
the offer was refused (2004, 208). Yet while these efforts were unsuccessful, proponents 
may value the utility of having the Saudis negotiating on America’s behalf.
To summarize, the level of Saudi cooperation in the war on terror was very 
ambiguous in the Pre-Sept. 11 period. While it appeared the Saudis were selective in
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their support for US anti-terror efforts, incongruous accounts (see Unger, 2004; Clarke, 
2004; Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004) shows the generally foggy nature of their internal and 
regional security dilemmas, which cannot receive adequate development here. It is clear 
that the Saudis publicly supported the effort, however, the extent of this cooperation is 
unclear.
Post-Sept. 11: Expatriation, Osama bin Laden, Public Criticism, and the War on Terror
The Post-Sept. 11 period showed the most adverse and conflicted state of US- 
Saudi Affairs. As discussed below, the 9-11 attacks rapidly changed the public’s 
perception of the Saudis because of their association with the attackers. This factor 
heightened the level of scrutiny on Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with US anti-terror 
efforts, which pushed this issue to the fore of the relationship.
The 9-11 attacks were a turning point in the American public’s perception of the 
Saudis and the US-Saudi partnership in particular. Aside from an Egyptian, a Lebanese, 
and a man from the United Arab Emirates, the remaining 15 of the 19 alleged hijackers 
were Saudi Arabian nationals (Coll, 2004). In addition, their suspected leader, Osama 
Bin Laden, was a Saudi national living off the wealth endowed by the bin Laden family 
who maintained close relationships with the Saudi Royal family (Unger, 2004). In light 
of these facts, Americans were stunned when they learned of a massive expatriation of 
Saudi royal family members and members of the Bin Laden family that occurred with the 
blessing of the US government during the hours following the terrorist attacks (Baer, 
2003; Clarke, 2004; Posner, 2005). In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the US 
government allegedly sanctioned the immediate departure of numerous members of the
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Saudi Royal family and the Bin Laden family, assumedly for fear of hostilities that might 
emerge against Muslim and Arab Americans (Clarke, 2004; Posner, 2005).
This has been a very controversial topic, and Administration officials have denied 
the incident even occurred; the official report from the 9-11 commission also fails to 
address the veracity of this story, which creates considerable ambiguity from a historian’s 
perspective. Nonetheless, speculation about the event’s occurrence invited a heightened 
level of public criticism and attention to the US-Saudi relationship, in particular, the ties 
between the Bush Family and the House of Saud. These events created a new set of 
questions about the relationship and, when combined with frequent escalations in the 
Middle-East, brought tremendous pressure on the White House (Fleischer, 2005).
Despite these developments, the US continued its sensitive relationship with the 
Saudis and commenced an extended round of diplomacy in the Middle East to lay the 
foundations for the US’s imminent war against terror. In October 2001, after instructing 
the National Security Council to withhold any information about the trip or its purposes, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld left on a multi-nation tour of the Middle-East that 
included a stop in Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 2002, 187). When he returned, Rumsfeld 
reported that the Saudis were in need of regular high-level diplomatic attention; while 
they were gracious, warm, and complimentary, the royal family remained worried that 
the US was “unhappy” (2002, 203). It is unclear from Woodward’s account whether the 
Saudis were referring to the White House specifically, or to the tenor of US public 
opinion. A month later, General Tommy Franks reported to senior officials of a similar 
six-country tour, which included Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 2002, 289). He was 
surprised at the warm reception he received; he related the Saudis’ understanding that the
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war on terror could be long, and that the highest Saudi officials pledged their cooperation 
in the war, despite “resistance” and “friction” in the lower levels of the Saudi government 
(2002, p. 289). This lower-level heel-dragging may have reflected a division among 
Saudi leadership over the issue of cooperation with the West.
Shortly following this trip, on November 9, President Bush met with Saudi 
foreign minister Prince Saud to forge a stronger sense of cooperation (Woodward, 2002, 
302). At the meeting the Prince agreed that solidarity would help rid Afghanistan of al 
Qaeda, after which Bush made the observation that Osama “hates you more than me” 
(2002, 302). To which the Prince replied that, “it’s an honor to be hated by someone like 
him” (2002, 302). Nonetheless, he assured Bush that the House of Saud would not cut its 
oil production to the US, which was then supplying roughly 8% of the U S’s daily 
consumption (2002, 302).
Before the US’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Administration publicly 
acknowledged a growing list of rationales for invading. Although it consistently voiced 
these concerns publicly, unmentioned was a concern over growing tensions in US-Saudi 
relations (Clarke, 2004, 265). The first of these, which Vice President Cheney, Deputy 
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld all acknowledged, 
was a growing threat of instability in the Saudi regime, which stemmed from the 
extended presence of US troops in the country -a  lasting “source of anti-Americanism 
threatening the ... regime” (2004, 265). The Saudis had experienced internal dissent and 
Uprisings for years, but the pattern was growing after US troops remained (Coll, 2004).
US policy makers began to consider the underlying factors of Saudi instability. 
Border security was among these concerns. In 2002, for example, US analysts were
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concerned about the Saudi’s ability to control its expansive unprotected 700-mile border 
with Yemen, a suspected crossover point for arms trafficking and terrorist groups like al 
Qaeda and others (Woodward, 2002, 327; Coll, 2004, 537). This concern peaked after 
the bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemeni port in October of 2000 (Coll, 2004, 537).
The event signaled a lapse in the US’s intelligence and military influence in the area 
(2004, 537). Analysts also became concerned about the pervasive presence of moles 
within the Saudi government.
Much earlier, the Saudis suspected many moles had infiltrated its military and 
security forces, which in the words of former FBI counter-terrorist head Richard Clarke, 
were “riddled with termites” (Clarke, 2004, 282). Another worrisome development was 
the growing Arab resentment of Saudi-US relations, which along with an increasing anti- 
Jewish and anti-western sentiment, became an typical theme of anti-American teachings 
in Mosques and religious schools (2004, 282). Evincing the heated threats from the 
Kingdom’s militants bent on overthrowing the Saudi regime, Saudi forces were 
frequently engaging in gun battles and street fighting with armed insurgents. The Saudis 
discovered a large arms cache intended to supply guerilla warfare efforts against US and 
Saudi facilities (2004, 282). In sum, the picture of Saudi stability was fading; Baer’s 
(2003) account of these developments also suggests systemic lapses in the regime’s 
security that may have long-term consequences for its longevity.
Adding to these internal security issues, however, were more deeply seeded 
cultural factors. A US general admitted that rising ethnic and extremist tensions in Saudi 
Arabia constituted an unconventional “battle of ideas” that, compared with a military 
incursion, was more difficult to surmount (Clarke, 2004, 263). Saudi Arabia ranked 3rd
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on a list of three nations prioritized by their importance to US interests, and by the 
likelihood that they will fall to al Qaeda insurgents (Clarke, 2004, 281). Adding to 
worries about Saudi vulnerability, the US received evidence that Saudi individuals and 
charities provided funds and cover for al Qaeda operatives prior to the 9-11 attacks 
(Clarke, 2004, 270). Clarke (2004) reported that, “Saudi government funds and those of 
concerned wealthy Saudis flowed to a series of charities and nongovernmental 
organizations, which in turn provided support for al Qaeda operatives” (282). It appeared 
that despite US concerns over Saudi stability, the region seemed like a hot-bed for 
security risks. Another factor adding to this issue was the relationship between Wahhabi 
Islam and the Saudi Royal family.
Al Qaeda’s fundamentalist beliefs meshed closely with those of many Saudi 
royals. The Saudis were influential in creating Wahhabist schools and mosques in key 
jihadist countries, as well as in the US and Europe (Clarke, 2004, 282; Schwartz, 2004). 
Although the US encouraged this activity in the region during the Afghan wars, now the 
trend became a worry for policy makers -an  example of what intelligence insiders call 
“blowback” (Coll, 2004; Baer, 2002). The Wahhabist reading of Islam instructed 
followers to spread the worldwide influence of Islam, and to not tolerate other religions -  
even alternative and moderate versions of Islam (Clarke, 281; Schwartz, 2004).
Moreover, as “keeper of the Two Holy Mosques,” Mecca and Medina, which remains the 
official title of the Saudi King, the House of Saud continued to derive its religious 
authority as a “protector of Muslims everywhere,” and “supporter of Islam everywhere” 
(Clarke, 2004, 281). The Saudi royal family, as directed by its own charter and more 
informally by its Wahhabi culture, supported the spread of its religion across the globe
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(2004, 204). At the same time, its partnership with the west undermined many tenets of 
Wahhabi Islam.
It appeared that the Saudi royals helped efforts to spread the global jihad and anti- 
Israeli activities in the Middle-East (2004, p. 282). It also seemed that the Saudis ignored 
the anti-American teachings and indoctrination of intolerance toward the west that 
pervaded the teachings in Wahhabi Mosques and Schools within the kingdom (2004, p. 
282). By removing a western-styled curriculum, and replacing it with a Wahhabist 
religious education, the Saudis took another step toward allowing western intolerance 
(2004, p. 282). These cultural factors could not have boded any sense of promise or 
stability. Policy makers may have prefigured these developments alongside an equally 
bothersome picture of the Kingdom’s security issues.
To summarize, the Post-Sept. 11 period created circumstances in which two 
issues became of paramount importance to both US and Saudi interests: public criticism 
and the war on terror. Because of the dynamic change in the US perception of Saudi 
Arabia in the aftermath of 9-11, Americans were increasingly skeptical of the 
relationship. For this reason, the Saudis’ ability to appear cooperative in the war on 
terror became a key priority. Here, the ambiguous level of real cooperation in this effort 
became another key development within this period.
The Bush-Saudi Relationship
Within the larger context of US-Saudi relations is a smaller, more intimate 
collection of relationships between the Bush family and the Saudi royal family. 
Considering the longevity and historical impact George HW Bush and George W Bush
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have and continue to have on both the domestic and international landscape, their 
ascendance to power in the past several decades warrants special consideration when 
discussing the US-Saudi relationship. Although difficult to summarize, an overview of 
this relationship is in order because of the central role these two families have come to 
play in both US political circles and in the larger geo-political arena. In much the same 
way that the US-Saudi relationship transformed in response to key developments in world 
affairs, the Bush-Saudi partnership adapted to key political and industrial developments 
following the oil embargo of 1973.
The financial and political connections that existed between the two families 
seemed to have emerged in tandem. Moreover, as they provide background for the 
rhetorical analysis of this study, these financial relationships explain yet another 
dimension of the economic interests underlying the partnership. Although they exist 
arguably in an un-official realm, they still relate to a study of ‘official rhetoric’ because 
of their longevity over time, because of their significance within the relationship, and 
because of they key role they play in constituting the rhetorical situation of the meeting 
and speeches in Crawford in 2002. In part due to the magnitude of financial co­
investment between the families, and the materialization of the partnership in conjunction 
with the Bush family’s rise to power, this familial relationship takes on unique 
importance when considered on its own and even more so with an eye toward official 
rhetoric. What follows is a surface-sketch of the dynamic political and financial ties that 
emerged and matured from the 1970s onward. These political and financial ambitions 
would help the Saudis gravitate into a strong personal alliance with the Bush family, 
which remains today.
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The financial ties between the Bush and Saudi families began in the seventies. 
According to published interviews with Time reporters, James Bath, a Houston attorney 
connected to Texas oil and the Bush family commenced a series of plane sales to Saudi 
royals and became the initial conduit for the Bush-Saudi relationship that followed 
(Unger, 2004; Beaty and Gwynne, 1991). Based on an account given to the Houston 
Chronicle (Unger, 2004, 33, 307; Urban, 1992), he also made a similar sale to Salem bin 
Laden, founder of the multi-billion dollar Saudi construction firm BinLaden Corp., and 
father of Osama Bin Laden; still later, he represented the bin Laden’s business interests in 
America beginning in 1976 (2004, 33). Bath became a channel through which the Saudis 
developed relationships with various Texas businesses and political figures during this 
period, which included two future Presidents, a Secretary of State, and numerous other 
political players. During this period, Houston became a bastion of Saudi oil profits. 
According to one account, over 80 private Houston firms cemented “strong business 
relationships” with various Saudi royals during this time (2004, p. 27). These 
relationships included access to the Bush family, who had emerged as powers in both the 
political and business sectors.
This trend of investment continued. From the 70s onward, wealthy Saudis began 
a wave of investments in American markets, which was part of the Saudi reinvestment 
strategy associated with JECOR, mentioned above. According to Unger (2004), “roughly 
eighty-five thousand ‘high-net-worth’ Saudis invested a staggering $860 billion in 
American companies -an  average of more than $10 million a person” (28). These 
investments found their way into major banks, energy companies, defense firms, 
technology businesses, and media conglomerates (2004, 28-29). Although the Saudis
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were clearly interested in profiting from healthy US markets, there was also a political 
outcome attached to their bidding.
As Unger (2004) explained, these investments were characterized into two 
general categories. On one hand, “there were blue chips such as Citigroup and AOL 
Time Warner, and huge, secretive consortiums such as Investicorp, which put billions 
into companies including Tiffany, Gucci, and Saks Fifth Avenue” (2004, 28). Balancing 
these high-volume investments, however, was a second type of investment aimed at 
fostering relationships with political elites. Unger describes these investments in the 
following passage:
The House of Saud also made a handful of investments in troubled companies that 
were loaded with debt and regulatory problems -which just happened to be owned 
by men who had or might have White House ties. (2004, 28)
Here is an investment strategy aimed at fostering relationships that offered access to
power. In one example of this strategy, a Saudi investor influenced the rescue of a
struggling Harken Energy Co. with a $24 million investment in 1987 when George W.
Bush was its director (2004, 200). It appears from this and other accounts (Baer, 2003),
that the Saudis sought to broaden their influence with American policy makers through
their financial strategies. If this was indeed their aim, they furnished it quite well by
drawing themselves closer to a family that would land itself in public offices from Texas
to Florida, and eventually three terms in the Oval Office.
The Bush-Saudi relationship demonstrated its fruitfulness when George H. W.
Bush rose to the Vice-Presidency in the Reagan administration. James Baker, then Chief
of Staff and close political and financial ally of George Bush, owned over 111,000 shares
of the Texas Commerce bank which was founded by his grandfather (Unger, 2004, 53).
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Simultaneously, Saudi broker Khalid bin Mahfouz teamed-up with Houston developer 
Gerald Hines to finance the Texas Commerce Tower in Houston, which became home to 
the Texas Commerce Bank (2004, 53). Amidst a wave of foreign investment in 
American banks, the Saudis now planted a financial seed that gained them access to the 
White House through Baker, and later through both George H. W. and George W. Bush. 
At the center of this strategy, which Unger calls “access capitalism,” is a firm called the 
Carlyle Group (2004).
The D.C.-based Carlyle Fund is a global private equity firm that currently 
manages over $24.8 billion, primarily in the defense, aerospace, energy, industry, 
commercial, and tech sectors (www.thecarlylegroup.com). The firm led what many 
financial analysts have dubbed a ‘mega-fund’ trend, whereby private equity firms 
strategically buy out and manage large conglomerates to make them more profitable. In 
2005, private equity firms, including Carlyle, managed over 14% of all global corporate 
mergers (Pearlstein, 2005, E-10). According to Washington Post financial writer Steven 
Pearlstein, “Carlyle’s strategy has not only been to aim for bigger funds, but to build on 
its original success with buyouts by offering a variety of other funds” (2005, E-10). The 
firm deals with high-dollar, high volume buyouts; according to its investor relations 
department, the firm requires a minimum investment of $5 million from individuals, and 
$25 million from companies or investor groups just to become what it deems a “qualified 
purchaser “ (www.thecarlvlegroup.com). The scope and volume of the firm’s 
investments are both key factors in the firm’s attractiveness to wealthy investors looking 
to leverage large sums of money in the most influential global markets.
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Perhaps more attractive, especially in the case of the Saudis, is Carlyle’s centrality 
to Washington power brokers, the most prominent of whom line its roster of advisors, 
consultants, investors, and managers. Among these are former Secretary of State James 
Baker, former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, former director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, Richard Darman, former British Prime Minister John Major, 
and former President George H. W. Bush.
The Saudis have actively invested in Carlyle funds in past decades. According to 
Unger’s (2004) estimate, members of the Saudi Royal family and companies under their 
control have invested over $1.2 Billion dollars in various Carlyle-owned corporations and 
funds (296). Their returns have arisen both in numbers and in political access. Among 
the roster of Carlyle advisors to visit the Saudis on behalf of the firm are George H. W. 
Bush, James Baker, and John Major, all of whom are heavily invested in the firm (2004, 
296).
These overlapping connections have been the source of much public controversy, 
especially after September 11th, when Carlyle forced the withdrawal of significant funds 
invested by the Saudi Bin Laden group in response to public criticism of the firm 
(Kopytoff, March, 2003). Also heightened have been criticisms of ‘war profiteering’ 
waged by war protesters like Jeff Grubler, who told the San Francisco Chronicle that 
“the people who are going to benefit from [the Iraq] war are George Bush’s friends, his 
dad and then himself, when he inherits the money” (Kopytoff, March, 2003). This tenor 
of criticism stemmed in part from the firm’s traditional focus on defense, aerospace, and 
energy firms.
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More generally, though, the firm has allowed investors like the Saudis 
unprecedented access both to major US policy makers and lucrative foreign investment 
opportunities in the world’s largest markets. What Unger calls, ‘access capitalism’ is a 
strategy to bring political, financial, and strategic interests to bear upon personal 
relationships, like those between the Saudi royals and the Bush family (2004). But the 
Saudi’s involvement with the Carlyle group indicates the financial element of a more 
complex political partnership, much of which occurred through the political ascendance 
of the Bush family.
In sum, the Saudis began gaining access to US power-brokers through George 
H.W. Bush’s rise to the White House, as well as the emerging oil and energy markets that 
originated in the Houston oil boom of the 70’s. What followed, however, was a period in 
which the Saudis’ political bargaining power improved as the former President’s son 
George W. Bush began his own rise to power from the Texas Governor’s office to the 
Oval Office on Pennsylvania Avenue. It was then that the Saudis wielded the most 
intimate and powerful influence with US policy makers in the White House.
The political and financial success of the Bushes was shared in tandem with the 
Saudis. They had calculated and maneuvered in such a way as to position themselves as 
long-time friends of the Bush family. In several sources (Bush, 2003; Unger, 2004; 
Schwartz, 2003), stories of family visits and intimate get-togethers between Bush family 
members and Saudi Royals like Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan color the Bush- 
Saudi history as warm, familial, and genuine. The sense of familiarity and openness 
seems to coincide with public accounts of their relationship, but it has also become the 
target of major public criticisms alleging conflicts of interest and undue influence on US
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policy. Evidence supporting these claims has become controversial in its own right, and 
will not receive extensive treatment here. On the whole, however, the account of the 
financial and political ties between the families illustrates the depth and complexity of the 
relationship. Although much of the relationship is hidden behind third parties, 
ambiguous investor relations, official “deniability mechanisms” (Unger, 2004), and 
issues surrounding national security, a surface sketch of the relationship reveals there is 
much more to this relationship than meets the eye.
To summarize, the Bush-Saudi relationship is an important part of the US-Saudi 
relationship because of the unusually close political and financial connections that exist 
privately between the families. Through major investment initiatives, political access- 
giving, and lasting mutual commitments in US foreign policy, this family allegiance is a 
key development within the larger diplomatic relationship.
Key Dimensions: Complexity, Secrecy, and Multi-dimensionality
The Saudi role in US foreign policy is indeed a complicated and influential one.
As it prefaces the analysis chapter of this study, this overview of the US-Saudi 
partnership comprises a crucial background for a study of official rhetoric. As Phillip 
Wander (1984) put it, “a full understanding of the rhetoric of American foreign policy 
must take into account... its relation to facts and events beyond the language employed, 
matters on which the lives of tens of millions, if not the whole of humanity, now depend” 
(340). From this chapter, we see three clear themes that characterize US-Saudi 
diplomacy: a multi-dimensional collection of national interests, an underlying complexity 
within each of those interests, and lastly, an inclination towards secrecy.
US-Saudi Diplomacy 67
In terms of the underlying interests of US-Saudi diplomacy, we see three distinct 
but overlapping dimensions of the relationship: economics, security, and Israeli.
Economic interests constitute one key dimension of the partnership. As leading members 
of OPEC, the chief supplier of “sweet” crude to the US, and major investors in US 
markets, the Saudis are major players in the global economy, which as outlined above, 
has predicated one major facet of the relationship. Secondly, the Saudis have continued 
their deep involvement in US military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. 
Their involvement in clandestine operations as well as overt strategic cooperation and 
intelligence sharing demonstrates the degree to which the Saudis help facilitate the US’s 
vital strategic interests in the region. Lastly, the Israeli-Palestinian issue has both 
economic and cultural underpinnings. As outlined above, this conflict may not 
necessarily predicate the relationship in the ways that oil and strategic interests do, but on 
the other hand, the 1973 oil embargo demonstrates the sensitivity and importance of the 
issue in the context of US-Saudi relations. In sum, we can conclude from the evidence 
above that the relationship is built upon a multi-dimensional set of interests.
Within each of these interests, however, remains another layer of complexity.
The strategic interests of the relationship, for example, are complex and overlapping. We 
see this complexity in the clandestine wars fought with Saudi assistance. Saudi support 
was imperative to US military efforts in the Cold War, the Iran-Iraq war, Gulf Wars I and 
I I , the hunt for Osama bin Laden, and has also become a major bargaining item in the 
most recent US campaign against terrorism. The variety of conflicts is compounded by 
the two states’ interests in regional security. It is clear that both parties care a great deal 
about defending Saudi soil, a concern that predicated the US’s rapid development of the
US-Saudi Diplomacy 68
Saudi military and intelligence agencies (Quandt, 1981). But what muddles this picture 
is the fact that each state has its own alliances, enemies, issues, and interests within the 
region that cannot possibly maintain a consistent sense of congruence. Hence, any 
attempt to simplify the nature of the US’s strategic interest is difficult because of the 
numerous factors that come to bear on this partnership.
This complexity is also seen in terms of economic interests. First, Saudi oil 
output is a keystone of the US’s energy policy. This fact alone makes the Saudis a 
pinnacle consideration for US foreign policy makers. The Saudis also have an enormous 
amount of capital invested in US markets and US firms, which adds another element to 
the list of economic ties. Lastly, when we consider Unger’s (2004) argument about 
access capitalism, it seems that the Saudis are also heavily invested in financing political 
capital among key US political actors. Some may question Unger’s position, but one 
cannot ignore the deftness with which the Saudis have gained entree with major political 
figures along side their monumental investments. While Unger offers a rare account of 
this growing political relationship, bolstered by corroborative testimony, interviews with 
participants, and de-classified documents, one is still left with questions about the 
motivations behind the Saudi-Bush strategy. Here again, it is difficult to simplify these 
economic interests because of the copious causes and aspects that impact this dimension 
of the relationship.
On the Palestinian-Israeli issue, it is perhaps even more difficult to simplify the 
parties’ interests. On the American side, the issue weighs heavily on the minds of 
politicians, especially during upcoming election years. On the other hand, the Saudis are 
in a unique quandary on the issue because their proximity to it. The Israeli army is
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arguably one of the most well-equipped and advanced threats to the Saudi state. Aside 
from this strategic point, there is also a deep religious and cultural sensitivity to the 
conflict for all Arabs, especially those in Saudi Arabia (Schwartz, 2003). Deeper still, the 
issue has powerful ramifications because of its significance to terrorist organizations who 
cite US support for Israel as motivation for regional and global attacks on US interests 
(2003). These are only a few of the ways the Israeli-Palestinian conflict impacts the 
relationship, but they demonstrate again the composite nature of the US-Saudi interests.
While the relationship’s multi-dimensional and complex interests characterize its 
history and guiding influences, its need for secrecy is also of key importance. Because so 
many of the relationship’s interests facilitate each party’s national security, it is easy to 
understand the need for secrecy. It would have been unthinkable, for example, if  the 
public were made aware of the US-Saudi involvement in the Afghan wars. For the same 
reasons that a military general will not announce his/her battle plans over CNN, many of 
the factors involved in the relationship cannot emerge because they would seriously 
jeopardize ongoing military efforts. If George W. Bush was correct when he said that, “a 
strategy by some would be to split the United States and Saudi Arabia,” when suggesting 
possible motives of the 9-11 hijackers, then we can understand that the relationship itself 
can become a military target (Bush, April 25, 2002). It is partially because of the 
relationship’s importance to vital US interests that it necessitates such a degree of secrecy 
among public officials. This is an especially salient factor for the upcoming analysis 
chapter for two reasons.
First, it justifies Wander’s (1984) argument that official foreign policy rhetoric 
“may not have any relation to the deliberation of policy” (339). Wander points out that
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one cannot directly access the underlying factors behind official rhetoric. After all, when 
we consider the multi-dimensional and complex nature of this specific relationship 
together with the national security issues associated with it, we can be certain that the 
substance of official rhetoric is not likely to signal a full-blown explanation of the 
philosophical, strategic, or economic foundations of US-Saudi foreign policy. Although I 
agree with the notion that official statements may not say anything about the real interests 
involved, what they do not say can actually tell us something. For example, secrecy may 
characterize the interests of a relationship simply because no information is offered in a 
positive way. The distinct absence of information may actually constitute a revealing 
message in itself.
Secondly, the issue of secrecy opens many doors for rhetorical analysis. If 
official rhetoric about US-Saudi diplomacy tells us nothing about the ‘true’ nature of the 
relationship, then what does it tell us? As Wander (1984) points out, a complete account 
of foreign policy rhetoric must examine first, its “ceremonial nature,” and second, its 
“function in domestic politics” before observing its squaring with history (340). Wander 
implies that foreign policy rhetoric is either ceremonial or aimed at domestic audiences 
more than it is intended to give a descriptive account of the policy or relationship in 
question. In the context of US-Saudi diplomacy, this idea remains salient insofar as it 
confirms what this chapter was intended to prove: the scope and interests underlying the 
relationship are far too complex, multi-dimensional, and often times unknown to allow 
for direct connections between official rhetoric and historical fact. Moreover, when we 
consider the necessity for secrecy in the relationship, this becomes even more evident.
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Beyond secrecy, the numerous dimensions and complexities in this relationship 
help inform a proper rhetorical analysis by providing an overview of a long and 
complicated relationship that has all to often been simplified, promoted, or criticized in 
the mainstream media without acknowledgement of these many nuances and ambiguities. 
In the next chapter, these complexities and multiple dimensions become important issues 
as White House officials attempt to explain this relationship to the public amidst heated 
regional conflict in the West Bank, and growing public suspicion about the relationship 
among both Western and Arab audiences.
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III Analysis
In this chapter, I will outline the emergence of two strategies -prophetic dualism, 
and domestication (Wander, 1984; Schiappa, 1989). Discussing the first of these, I will 
explain how White House rhetoric bolsters claims about the relationship’s importance to 
world peace and the war on terror hetoric by making use of a strategy Wander called 
prophetic dualism (1984). Secondly, I will outline the White House’s use of another 
strategy that Schiappa called domestication (1989), in which several relational metaphors 
personify an image of a strong US-Saudi relationship. There I will show how official 
rhetoric described the content of the US-Saudi talks through a set of metaphors like 
friendship, family, and western hospitality, to overtly personify the relationship.
However, to fully describe the rhetorical situation in which White House rhetoric 
appears, a brief summary of audience is in order.
One of the major issues facing US-Saudi diplomacy in the Spring of 2002 was the 
torrent of public criticism of the relationship, both in the US and within the Saudi 
Kingdom. With deeply interconnected business, political, financial, strategic, and 
military actors, the relationship has become a magnet for critics who perceive 
impropriety. Indeed, one of the major problems facing the administration is the task of 
justifying and promoting a relationship that by its very nature is shrouded in strict secrecy 
and protected by national security interests as well as those of military, industrial, and 
political elites, as explained in Chapter II. At the heart of most criticisms are the 
profitable relationships between the Saudi Royal family and many members of the Bush 
family. These connections exist by way of a revolving door between the private and 
public sectors of US policy, defense, and intelligence organizations, as outlined in
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Chapter II. These critics highlight the multi-billion dollar investments between these two 
families through their political and business associates. Here arises the central strategic 
problem of communicating about a diplomatic relationship that encapsulates a wealth of 
criticism with both foreign and domestic audiences.
Several foreign and domestic audiences had an interest in President Bush’s April 
25 address and in Subsequent White House addresses. On the domestic front, voters 
were still uncertain of the nature of the US-Saudi partnership. Public criticism in major 
US press outlets continued to assail the relationship on issues of Saudi anti-terror efforts, 
terrorist sponsorship, and the Kingdom’s ability to produce the 9-11 hijackers. Voters 
may have also been concerned about the price of oil at the time. Another domestic 
audience was also interested in this issue. Investors, especially those reluctantly clinging 
to their energy-sector holdings after the Enron escapade were equally sensitive about the 
volatility of energy prices in relation to the price of oil and petroleum; they were also 
concerned with the growing escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has 
frequently impacted the price of oil. Nonetheless, oil prices, regional stability, and 
terrorism weighed on the minds of domestic audiences.
In terms of international audiences, the Arab world as well as Japanese energy 
investors each had a stake in the meeting. Arabs continue to observe the tenor and tone 
of US-Saudi diplomacy. On one hand, many may object to an image of closeness or 
friendliness between President Bush and the Crown Prince Abdullah. It may signal the 
weakened stance of anti-westerners who denounce the US troop presence on Muslim holy 
land. Terrorists within Saudi Arabia claim an interest in the relationship for these central 
reasons, and were another key audience. On the other hand, many Arabs who opposed
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Jewish expansion in Palestinian territory have favored the notion of closeness between 
the US and Saudi Arabia insofar as it signals the US’s willingness to appease Arab 
interests when balanced against the expansive and influential Jewish lobby. They may 
have also perceived increased legitimacy in an Arab nation who appeared to court 
western interests.
Outside the Arab world, Japan, which is Saudi Arabia’s other major energy 
importer, had a considerable stake in the US-Saudi talks. One could easily speculate that 
Japanese energy investors were curious about the tone and topic of the talks. If the US 
signaled a closer relationship with the Saudis, what might be the implications for 
Japanese interests? Israeli-Palestinian violence threatened further volatility in global 
energy markets, which explained one significant Japanese stake in US-Saudi diplomacy. 
In sum, international audiences were closely tuned to the tone and topic of the talks, 
looking for signals that might foreshadow developments in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, 
or any notable impacts on the price of Saudi oil. Arabs in particular were more 
concerned with the perceived closeness or friendliness between President Bush and the 
Crown Prince.
Responding to the unique sensitivities of both foreign and domestic audiences, 
White House officials discussed the US-Saudi talks through two distinctive strategies, the 
first of which appeared in an attempt to include the Saudis as our allies in the President’s 
‘war on terror.’
US-Saudi Diplomacy 75
Prophetic Dualism: Good vs. Evil, the War on Terror, and the Partnership fo r  Peace 
The President, during his speech on April 25th, 2002, described the US-Saudi 
relationship as a unique partnership, one that helped satisfy the US’s efforts toward peace 
in the Middle-East. He re-assured audiences that the relationship was both important and 
strong, signaling a sense of near complacency while attempting to address the escalating 
violence between Palestinian and Israeli troops. In the wake of this conflict, the President 
focused on Saudi Arabia’s position as a potential peace partner, one that might help 
dissolve the spiking conflict to ensure a more stable region and assist the US’s war on 
terror. As explained here, the President’s descriptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
use a good-vs.-evil motif in which the Saudis battle terror by promoting a peaceful 
standoff. In doing so, White House rhetoric conformed to a strategy that Wander (1984) 
called Prophetic Dualism  because the President created a good-vs.-evil battle via the war 
on terror, one in which the Saudis appeared as our partners for peace.
As the President and other White House spokespersons illustrated the importance 
of the US-Saudi partnership “to the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East and 
the world,” they focused on Saudi cooperation on two pivotal issues: the war on terror 
and the Middle East peace process (April 25). To do so, however, they highlighted 
certain characters and nations as playing a good or evil role by making both implicit and 
explicit reference to the ‘axis of evil,’ and other motifs found in President Bush’s 2002 
State of the Union Address. In this speech, the President described the world in terms of 
a good-vs.-evil motif, (which became an important fixture in the April 25, 2005, address).
A popular convention for framing international conflicts, the good vs. evil motif 
has served several administrations preceding George W. Bush’s, and has become a
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frequent rhetorical tool for interpreting the complexities of foreign affairs. In the 
Crawford address, Bush, like his two predecessors, relied on renditions of the Cold War 
dichotomy between good and evil to dramatize the US’s war on terror. This description 
of the world’s geopolitical landscape in terms of moral right and universal good became a 
metaphorical stage upon which Bush told a dramatic narrative likened to the Cold War 
Drama outlined in Stuckey’s (1995) essay. In effect, this dramatic narrative used a 
metaphor through which the public gained an understanding of a complex conflict.
As an orientational metaphor, The Cold War Drama encapsulates national actors 
through dramatic narratives like those found in the prolific battle between Soviet 
Communism and Western Democracy that emerged during the Cold War. Cast as an 
‘evil empire’ made most popular in President Reagan’s speeches, the Soviet Union was 
described as a great evil force in the world, one with which the US fought a noble and 
successful battle. It is a story that relies upon what Phillip Wander described as a 
prophetic dualism, or a dichotomous division of the world between forces of good and 
evil (1995; 1984). Although it may have served well during the proxy-wars between the 
West and Communism, this Manichean dualism between good and evil is more difficult 
to apply in recent times without some adaptation to historical circumstances. Namely, 
without a visible looming global superpower like the former Soviet Union, a more 
contemporary adaptation of this morally dichotomous worldview relies upon a new figure 
of evil, the “axis of evil,” which emerges in Bush’s post-9-11 rhetoric as he outlines the 
war on terror.
The most salient example of the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor first appeared in President 
Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address. Following the traumatic events of 9-11, the
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President outlined the US’s policies toward combating terror across the globe. In doing
so, he made reference to several state-sponsors of terror as one cohesive group, the “axis
of evil.” In the following passage from Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address (Jan. 29,
2002), we see the prolific introduction of this slogan into public dialogue.
States like these (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq), and their allies, constitute an axis 
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide 
arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack 
our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the 
price of indifference would be catastrophic. (Jan. 29, 2002)
Similar to the “evil empire” slogan attached to the former Soviet Union, the “axis of evil”
sets the stage of global conflict in terms of good and evil, right and wrong. Here, the axis
of evil encompasses several national actors like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, but also
includes their allies —all of whom are “arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Jan.
29, 2002). The axis of evil brings together a list of the US’s enemies through an
orientational metaphor that describes conflict in morally-laden terms (Stuckey, 1995). In
classic fashion, the US is on the good side of a battle between good and evil - a  battle
where the outcome is either a more peaceful world, or one in which our elusive enemies
continue to “pose a grave and growing danger” (Jan. 29, 2002). These enemies are
among “tens of thousands o f ... dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder,
often supported by outlaw regimes,” and are “spread throughout the world like ticking
time bombs, set to go off without warning” (Jan. 29, 2002). It is in the context of these
descriptions that the President’s “war on terror” takes shape as a moral imperative to
protect the US and its allies from states “arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Jan.
29, 2002). It is in light of these fearsome descriptions that the White House rhetoric
makes a distinct contrast when discussing Saudi relations. The construction of evil in the
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post-9-11 narrative, involving characters described above in situations that pose ‘grave
danger’ to the peaceful world, is an important literary component to the White House’s
depiction of its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which is distinctively friendly, warm, and
cordial, hence, a ‘partnership for peace.’
The narrative of the US’s post-9-11 experience in the war on terror allows the
President and other officials to position the Saudis as our partners in the war on terror -
more specifically, as our partners in the battle for world peace. Officials appeal to ideas
like partnership and Arab multi-lateralism when they describe the Saudis and Crown
Prince Abdallah as visionary leaders of world peace. Here, depictions of the Saudis as
our partners for peace, allies against terrorism, and leaders in the ongoing Middle-East
crises between Israel and Palestine display the ‘importance’ of the US-Saudi partnership.
When talking about the US-Saudi relationship, for example, Bush uses the
interlocking terms of “partnership” and “peace.” His rhetoric associates these two terms
with the Saudis to paint a positive image of their role in world affairs, which we see in
the following excerpt from the April 25th Crawford address:
Our partnership is important to both our nations. And it is important to the 
cause of peace and stability in the Middle East and the world. We 
discussed the critical importance of the war on terror. Much of our 
discussion centered on the Middle East, and how to defuse the current 
situation so we can get back on the path to peace.
This passage describes two items. It outlines both the substance and goals of the
relationship. Substantively speaking, Washington and Riyadh are in a ‘partnership,’ the
goal of which is ‘peace and stability in the Middle East, and the World.’ Of more
concrete importance to the relationship are several items: the war on terror, defusing
Arab-Israeli conflict, and more generally, the cause of peace in the world and within the
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Arab region. The word ‘important,’ is a functional linkage between ‘nations,’ ‘peace,’ 
‘stability,’ and the ‘war on terror.’ ‘Important’ becomes a vehicle of association; it 
associates the Saudis with peace, stability, and the war on terror. These associations also 
serve a second function as they help construct a metaphor for describing the relationship.
As an orientational metaphor, the war on terror re-situates the US-Saudi 
relationship by framing its goals in light of this global initiative, rather than the multitude 
of other overlapping interests between the parties, which become trivial details in light of 
the dramatic narrative into which the two nations are drawn. Outlining the implicit 
purpose of the meeting, Bush frames the relationship in terms of moral goals associated 
with stability and peace in the context of the war on terror, stating that “our discussion 
centered on the Middle East, and how to defuse the current situation [to] get back on the 
path to peace” (April 25). And while this conception of the war on terror helps situate the 
purpose of the meeting within moral framing, it also helps situate the Saudis as our 
partners for peace. The ‘partnership for peace,’ however, takes place within a larger 
regional context, which may allows the administration to emphasize a multi-lateral 
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, another key topic of the address.
Creating the Appearance o f Leadership: The Role o f  Arab Multilateralism
A  regional multilateral approach to both the war on terror and the Middle-East 
peace process was another key concept that appeared in Bush’s address. A central 
component of the war on terror is the idea that the US’s regional allies will help quell 
conflict and stop the spread of terrorism. This notion of Arab multilateralism in which 
the Saudis become part of a larger effort toward world peace is one that also helps
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magnify the Crown Prince’s leadership. During his April 25th address, Bush dramatized 
this role, saying the Saudi Crown Prince “recognizes that America can’t do it alone... it’s 
going to require a unified effort,” but he added that the Crown Prince is “a man with 
enormous influence in the Middle E a s t... I ’m confident we can work together to achieve 
a peace” (April 25). Bush implies a nod toward Arab multilateralism, and positions the 
Crown Prince as a leader in that effort. Bush depicts their meeting as an attempt to 
“solidify” a multilateral effort toward peace; he added that “our discussion ... was how to 
get back on the path to peace” (April 25). He stressed the need for “withdrawal by 
Israel” and “for the Palestinian Authority to clamp down on terror” -tw o goals to which 
Arab leaders like Abdullah can pledge their support. More broadly, the role of a multi­
lateral Arab effort helps position the Crown Prince, and the Saudis, as leaders in a 
regional effort to resolve Israeli-Palestinian standoffs and what Bush describes as 
Palestinian support for terrorism.
The White House’s emphasis on Arab Multilateralism also allowed for more 
glowing descriptions of the Crown Prince. After all, ongoing peace efforts rely not only 
on a multi-lateral initiative, but more specifically upon a leader to initiate change. The 
multilateral approach to these issues creates a rhetorical opportunity for White House 
speechwriters to position the Saudis as stepping up to lead the charge. Inasmuch as their 
leadership supports an end to violence and state-sponsored terrorism, the Saudis continue 
to play a good role in the fight against evil encompassed in the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor 
discussed above. This notion of leadership extends into Bush’s descriptions of the Crown 
Prince as well.
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Leadership functions in two ways in Bush’s rhetoric. As described above, Saudi
leadership facilitates a multi-lateral solution to the war on terror and the “Path to Peace,”
as Bush frequently refers to it (April 25). But the leadership theme also facilitates a
dramatic role, into which Saudi Leader Abdullah can step. Bush explained how much he
appreciated the Prince’s “vision for a peaceful and integrated Middle East,” and also how
he “appreciated his leadership in helping rally the Arab world toward that vision” (April
25). Here, the idea of visionary leadership is closely connected with Bush’s hopes for a
multi-lateral solution.
Conversely, the notion of Arab multilateralism positions the Crown Prince in the
role of a visionary peace-maker, which fits nicely within the war on terror’s moralistic
rhetoric. Bush’s positive characterizations of the Crown Prince, bolsters this impression.
In a press conference following a major withdrawal of Israeli troops, Bush elaborated:
As we work to improve the security situation in the region, all of us must step up 
our efforts... I called Crown Prince Abdallah to thank him for his visit... The 
Crown Prince has offered a number of constructive ideas for making political 
progress between Israel and the Palestinians. We will continue to build on these 
ideas, as we move forward to fight terror and to promote peace in the Middle 
East. (April 28)
This passage best supports a perception of the Crown Prince as a diligent proponent of 
peace. His “constructive ideas for making political progress” appear to have facilitated, 
in part, the announced withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arafat’s compound, and also 
from Ramallah -a  move the Israeli cabinet announced just hours before this address on 
April 28. As Bush stressed his desire to “continue to build on these ideas as we move 
forward” he seemed to imply that the Prince’s “constructive ideas” played and would 
continue to play a central role in the ongoing peace processes. Coming after a short
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statement that was critical of Chairman Arafat (April 28), this statement paints a more 
glowing picture of the Crown Prince, simply by way of juxtaposition. But if the Crown 
Prince was worried about the public perceiving ambiguity in his role as a peace- 
proponent, he must have appreciated a speech given by White House National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice on April 29th, where she explained the role of Arab 
multilateralism and Saudi Leadership.
During a foreign policy address at Johns Hopkins University on April 29th, Dr. 
Rice was asked a question that President Bush had been asked just days earlier when 
prodded to comment on the “Abdallah Plan” for Middle-East Peace. In her response, she 
explained:
Every element of [the plan] may not be workable... But we need to keep our eye 
on the big picture here, and the promise of deeper Saudi engagement in the peace 
process would be a tremendous breakthrough for the entire process. The truth of 
the matter is that while we all focus very heavily on the Israeli-Palestinian piece 
of this, this, of course, takes place in a regional context... Israel has to have 
security with its neighbors; it has to have normal relations with its neighbors... It 
needs to move to normal relations with the other Arab states. And the Arab 
states, who also have a stake in the way that the Israeli-Palestinian issues are 
resolved, have to have a stake in the final outcome of those negotiations.
So we believe that what the Saudi initiative most represents is a new impetus to 
have Saudi engaged as Jordan and Egypt have been in bringing peace to the 
region as a whole. And so we have been extremely positive about it; we’ve 
embraced the concept in large parts... we think it’s a tremendously powerful tool 
and [an] extremely important step in this long-running conflict. (April 29)
Dr. Rice, a respected expert in Soviet affairs and balance of power issues, makes a well-
developed case for Arab multilateralism. She stresses the importance of other regional
“neighbors” in resolving this dispute. She also describes the conflict as a “process”
rather than a specific negotiation, which helps her build-up the importance of regional
actors like the Saudis. In sum, however, she paints a shining picture of the Crown Prince
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as someone whose ideas for peace are having a catalytic impact upon the peace process -  
a “tremendous breakthrough,” “a new impetus” for engagement, and ultimately, “a 
tremendously powerful tool and [an] important step in this long-running conflict” (April 
29). Her descriptions help situate the Prince in a superlative light within the broader idea 
of Arab multilateralism with which she frames this issue.
Other officials also echoed the multilateral position. In his May 1 press briefing, 
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer also reiterated the role of Arab nations in Middle East peace 
during:
It’s always been the President’s view that the way to bring peace to the Middle 
East was to work with the Israelis, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab 
nations, to find ways for all the parties to work together. And that involves 
multiple conversations on multiple levels... It’s always going to be interactive. 
(May 1, 2002)
This “interactive,” multilateral approach makes a good deal of sense; after all, one 
usually thinks of negotiations as quickly resolved with handshakes from the sides 
involved -essentially a facilitative bi-lateral event akin to the failed negotiations between 
Sharon and Arafat during the Clinton administration. Officials described the issue as a 
“long-running conflict,” and add although the Saudi plan is “tremendously powerful,” it 
is merely an “important step” in the larger process (Rice, April 29, 2002). Adding a 
sense of longevity to the peace effort, Dr. Rice reminded her audience that “we need to 
keep our eye on the big picture here, and the promise of deeper Saudi engagement in the 
peace process would be a tremendous breakthrough for the entire process” (April 29, 
2002). Rice’s choice of the word “breakthrough” also echoes Bush’s April 25th 
statement, when he characterized the Crown Prince’s condolences toward Israel as a 
“breakthrough moment.”
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Dr. Rice also expanded her conception of the conflict as a “process” in order to 
place value on both regional multilateralism, and hence on the Crown Prince’s leadership 
therein (April 29, 2002). Emphasis on process meshes nicely with official discussion of 
Arab multi-lateralism and the value of “multiple level” discussions (April 29, 2002). The 
multi-party, process-oriented, coalition-building approach to conflict clearly favors those 
who can lead -presumably leaders of “tremendous influence” like Abdullah (Bush, April 
25). It seems that the administration underscores their long-term hopes for peace by 
including other nations into the peace process. If this were simply a bi-lateral issue, then 
more emphasis could focus on the two state actors involved, but given this expanded 
framing, and Bush’s de-valuirig of Arafat’s ability to aid the peace process (discussed 
below), Arab leaders like the Crown Prince are in an improved position to help facilitate 
the process.
As it relates to the White House’s overall framing of the US-Saudi relationship,
Dr. Rice’s speech helped reinforce the moralistic framing of the relationship by 
emphasizing the important Saudi role in the Middle-East peace process. As echoed 
throughout other officials’ statements, Rice’s expanded conception of Arab 
multilateralism allows Saudi leadership to assume a pivotal role both within the Israeli- 
Palestinian resolution and with the broader war on terror as well. But this expanded 
conception of regional cooperation is not the only rationale that helps position the Crown 
Prince.
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Highlighting Cooperation and Condemnation
What also improved the Crown Prince’s role in the war on terror narrative was his
public condemnation of terror, which the White House continually emphasized in its
statements. In his April 25th address, Bush stated he “appreciated the Crown Prince’s
assurances that Saudi Arabia condemns terror.” Shortly afterwards, during a question-
and-answer period, Bush elaborated further on Abdullah’s stance toward terror, and
seemed to emphasize Abdallah’s rhetoric more frequently than his actions:
The Crown Prince has been very strong in condemning the murder of U.S. 
citizens. He’s been very strong about condemning those who committed those 
murders. And I appreciate that a lot. Right after 9/11, he was one of the strongest 
voices of condemnation. He understands how devious Osama bin Laden has 
been. He knows that -  that anybody who—you know, that a strategy by some 
would be to split the United States and Saudi Arabia. It’s a strong and important 
friendship, and he knows that and I know that, and we’re not going to let that 
happen. So he’s been very strong in the condemnation of terror, for which I’m 
grateful. (April 25)
In Bush’s depiction, the Saudi Prince not only stands against terror publicly, but also has 
empathy for the US in the war on terror because his country was an indirect target in the 
attacks. As Bush somewhat reluctantly explained, the 9-11 planners, including Osama 
bin Laden, were attempting to sever the US-Saudi relationship, which would hurt both 
parties. By repositioning the Saudis as victims of this tragedy, Bush allows the public to 
view the Saudis not only as our friends by referring to the US-Saudi “friendship,” but 
also associates them as an ally in the fight against the axis of evil through their mutual 
suffering of 9-11. Again, helping the Saudis stand on our side in the metaphorical battle 
between forces of good and evil, the generic evidence of Saudi condemnation supports a 
conclusion that the Saudis are our allies in a global effort to fight terror.
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Bush also supports claims about Saudi cooperation in other statements, which 
attempt to show specific evidence of US-Saudi aid in the war on terror. He referred to 
US-Saudi intelligence-sharing, Saudis “cutting o f f ’ terrorist money, and ongoing 
attention to security along the Yemeni border to “make sure that Yemen doesn’t become 
a haven for al Qaeda killers,” to demonstrate the President’s claims that the Saudis made 
several efforts to stabilize the region (April 25). By facilitating a more stable Middle- 
East, the Saudis help create a safer and more peaceful world, and become our valued 
partners for peace.
Unfortunately for reporters, the President never gives any specific examples 
beyond his general references. On this point, the issue of secrecy becomes very 
important in relation to White House rhetoric on the Saudis. As outlined in Chapter II, 
the US-Saudi relationship is based upon regional strategic interests that relate to the US’s 
vital economic and military interests. Especially when dealing with security issues, the 
President may lack the ability to provide specific evidence of bi-lateral cooperation on 
the terrorism issue in particular. On the other hand, this is one of the major criticisms of 
the Saudi regime -its  instability and negligence in preventing terrorist recruitment and 
funding within its borders and beyond. Nonetheless, when interpreting official White 
House rhetoric on the issue of terrorism, the evidence one must analyze becomes murky 
with vague references like the ones mentioned above. In the end however, these 
statements help characterize the Crown Prince and the Saudis as allies in the morally 
dichotomous struggle between good and evil.
Within this epic struggle, a positive characterization of the Saudis and their 
Crown Prince relies upon three ideas that have been so far discussed. First, is the
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“Abdullah plan,” or the Saudi peace plan, which demonstrates that the Saudis, Prince 
Abdullah specifically, have unique and proven ideas for peace. Second is the notion of 
Saudi leadership in the White House’s discussion of Arab Multilateralism. Third is the 
idea of Saudi cooperation in the war on terror, which arises in White House 
characterizations of the Saudi condemnations of terror. Taken together, these ideas help 
shape a polished narrative about the US-Saudi relationship that fits nicely into a 
contemporary rendition of the Cold War saga between good and evil.
These three ideas -the  Saudi vision of peace, Saudi leadership in the Arab states, 
and Saudi condemnation of terror, all address Bush’s opening claims about the 
relationship and its “importance.” They also help support the Administration’s 
multilateral approach to the region. In sum, these three statements serve as evidence 
supporting Bush’s characterizations of the relationship. As evidence, these claims 
support a specific conclusion about the Saudis, as depicted in abstract argumentation 
below:
Premise: Saudis value peace
Sub-Claim 1: Saudis want peace between Israel and Palestine
Evidence 1: Saudis lead Arab multi-lateral Middle-East peace talks 
Sub-Claim2: Saudis want peace in the world
Evidence 2 : Saudi leaders condemn terror 
Warrant: Saudi partnership is “important to the cause of peace and stability in 
the Middle-East and the World” (April 25).
Although logically arranged here, these arguments are much more diffused as they appear 
in the texts of official rhetoric. Terms like “partnership,” “peace,” “leadership,” and 
“importance” cement the logical construction of ideas which frame our thoughts about 
the relationship. These word associate subjects like the US, the Crown Prince, and Arab 
states, with concepts that are central to Bush’s depictions of the relationship. His
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statements rely on descriptions to frame the public’s impressions of various actors in this 
dramatic rendition. The word “importance” for example, does not say much by way of 
specifics; it simply attaches value to a certain subject, like “peace,” “partnership,” or the 
“war on terror,” and subsequently frames the Saudis and other Arab states as mutually 
invested in this effort.
When discussing US interests in the Middle-East conflict, Bush focuses on the 
“shared vision,” between the US and the Saudis, an idea that permeates his April 25 
address. He explains the US’s position on the violent escalations in Rammallah and 
Bethlehem as a centerpiece of his policy toward the Middle-East, and frequently 
highlights the role of Arab states in resolving this conflict, namely, the visionary 
leadership of the Crown Prince Abdullah. He continually emphasizes this regional 
approach, as seen in his opening statement, when he states that “Our two nations share a 
vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security,” 
adding that “all parties have responsibilities to help achieve that vision” (April 25). Here, 
he underlines the significance of the issue, and his belief in a regional approach that 
involves “all parties” - a  nod to Arab nations in the region (April 25). He symbolically 
reiterates the idea of a US-Arab partnership as the fulcrum of current resolution efforts.
In doing so, Bush seems to distinguish himself from Presidents like Clinton, who relied 
less upon Arab partners by maintaining a more direct, unilateral approach to the conflict, 
like the direct approach he took in the legendary talks that culminated in a rare hand­
shake between the two Middle-East leaders. In contrast, Bush’s expanded approach limits 
perceptions of US interventionism and underscores the value of Arab leadership as a 
chief component to this multilateral regional effort.
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The concept of Arab multilateralism then becomes an anchoring device for Arab 
leadership insofar as it sets-up the Crown Prince Abdallah in a role of peace-maker. 
Building on his descriptions of Arab multilateralism, Bush introduces several ideas that 
help construct a policy of US reliance on Arab states both to combat terrorism, and to 
mitigate the flaring tensions in the West Bank. This policy helps situate a more 
complementary rendition of the Saudis, as described here in an excerpt from Bush’s April 
25th address:
We discussed the need for Arab states to condemn terror, to stop 
incitement of violence, and as part of a long-term peace, to accept Israel as 
a nation and a neighbor. We also agreed the world must join in offering 
humanitarian aid to the many innocent Palestinians who are suffering.
I told the Crown Prince how much I appreciate his vision for a peaceful 
and integrated Middle East, and how I appreciated his leadership in 
helping rally the Arab world toward that vision. I also appreciated the 
Crown Prince’s assurance that Saudi Arabia condemns terror.
Bush paints a picture of US reliance on multiple Arab partners to facilitate its interests in
the region. This multi-lateral approach positions the Crown Prince as its invaluable
leader in “helping rally the Arab world toward that vision” (April 25). From this passage,
one can see the complementary interaction between the notions of Arab multilateralism
and Arab leadership. This interaction facilitates the re-positioning of the Crown Prince as
an influential visionary of peace.
Indeed, Bush’s explanation above grooms Abdallah as a prominent US peace
partner. During questioning at the April 25th address, Bush described the Crown Prince
as “a man with enormous influence in the Middle East,” and added, “I respect that a lot,
and I ’m confident we can work together to achieve a peace.” After enhancing the
Prince’s diplomatic credibility, Bush took several opportunities to spin a more positive
framing of the Crown Prince, as in the following excerpt:
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W e’re interested in his advice, we’re interested in his counsel. We share a 
vision and I reminded him how much I appreciated his statement toward 
Israel. I thought that was a breakthrough moment... And then he went and 
sold that in Beirut, and I appreciated that as well
Here, Bush offers several examples to support a positive framing of the Prince’s role as a 
multi-lateral Arab partner. First, Bush creates the Abdallah-as-diplomatic-partner image, 
and expresses interest in his “advice,” and “counsel,” which denotes the role of an 
advisor or counselor, implying he is the US’s trusted friend. We typically assume an 
advisor or counselor is someone with some sort of technical, professional, or expertise- 
related credentials to deserve our trust and consideration. Secondly, Bush reiterates their 
shared commitment to peace in the West Bank to highlight the Prince’s “breakthrough” 
condolences towards Israel. Lastly, and most importantly, the President refers to 
Abdallah’s participation in a recent Arab Summit in Beirut as evidence to his strong 
leadership within Arab diplomatic circles. Referring to his “breakthrough” statement that 
he “went... and sold ... in Beirut,” he offers evidence to support his positive rendition of 
the Prince’s leadership. This leadership role not only builds a more positive public 
impression, but also demonstrates how this Arab partner facilitates US regional interests. 
Thus the Crown Prince is both a practical and attractive ally.
Again, by focusing on overlapping interests in Middle-East peace, officials 
describe the peace process in terms of goals and means. Our goal is a “lasting peace,” 
and dependable Arab leadership is a means to facilitate this goal. The Crown Prince plays 
a crucial role in that effort by “rallying the Arab world,” and more importantly Arab 
states, behind our shared cause. The idea of Arab leadership is difficult to support, 
however, because one must assume a link between symbolic and national leadership. By
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describing the Prince as the a leader in rallying the “Arab World,” Bush implies a sense 
of symbolic leadership between Crown Prince Abdallah and the Arab world akin to the 
symbolic leadership of the Pope for practicing Catholics and the Catholic community at 
large. The veracity of Bush’s descriptions thus become difficult to assess without 
regional expertise. Although difficult to support, the President may not need to; his 
depictions are aimed at an audience of Americans, most of whom have little knowledge 
of Arab culture to which they could make a comparison. It is perhaps with this 
knowledge of audience that White House rhetoric develops a sharp contrast between 
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and Crown Prince Abdallah.
Arab Leadership, Multilateralism, and the Vilification o f Yasir Arafat
To shine a more positive light on the Prince, the White House vilifies Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat in its public assessments of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. White
House statements frequently describe Arafat as an obstacle to regional peace. In a May 1st
conference Secretary Fleischer said that “The United States will continue to press the
Palestinian Authority to fulfill their obligations to stop terrorism” (May 1). Implying the
Palestinian leader’s lapse in responsibility, Fleischer’s comment reflects the general tenor
of White House rhetoric. During his April 25th address, Bush explained:
The Palestinian Authority must do more to stop terror. Israel must finish 
its withdrawal, including resolution of standoff in Rammallah and 
Bethelem, in a non-violent way. We discussed the need for Arab states to 
condemn terror, to stop incitement of violence, and as part of a long-term 
peace, accept Israel as a nation and a neighbor.
The statement about the “need for Arab states to condemn terror” implies that Arafat has
not been doing this. By contrast, Bush applauds Saudi leadership just a moment later,
US-Saudi Diplomacy 92
saying “I appreciated the Crown Prince’s assurances that Saudi Arabia condemns terror” 
(April 25). By positing the need for the Palestinian Authority to “clamp down on terror,” 
while simultaneously applauding the Saudis, Bush sets-up a kind of good-guy-versus- 
bad-guy scenario. The Saudis, good guys, are trying to facilitate peace, and we are 
working with them in that effort. Meanwhile, Arafat becomes the bad guy by appearing 
to halt or slow the process. Audiences may see Arafat as an obstacle to peace because 
they may perceive an unwillingness on his part to stop terrorism.
Moreover, in light of Bush’s multilateral framing of the peace process, he can 
reasonably urge Arab states like the Saudis to help prod the Palestinians in this direction. 
He acknowledges a very limited Israeli involvement, as though all the Israelis were trying 
to do is withdraw from Palestinian territory, and shifts much of the responsibility on Mr. 
Arafat, and upon Arab leadership as an impetus to a resolution. Again, this division 
between good and evil seems to eliminate many of the nuances of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Bush’s statement outlines the conflict through a simplistic problem-solution 
order. In the quote above, the Palestinian Authority (and Mr. Arafat by association) are 
the problem by not doing more to stop terror. For this statement to be true, we are to 
logically assume through logic that the “terror” to which Bush refers arises solely from 
Palestinian territory and is hence the sole responsibility of the Palestinian Authority.
After clarifying this as the central problem, Bush makes a generalized nod to the Israelis, 
and then calls upon Arab states to “condemn terror, to stop incitement of violence, and as 
part of a long term peace, accept Israel as a nation and a neighbor” (April 25). Here, he 
positions the Palestinian Authority and Mr. Arafat as the problem, and an emerging 
coalition of Arab states as a solution.
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By implication, Bush also seems to define Palestinian aggression as terrorism, 
while Israeli force might not carry the same connotation. Secondly, he addresses the role 
of Arab states in reigning-in Arafat by way of implication. During questioning following 
his April 28th address, Bush offered the following statements in regards to the Palestinian 
leader.
Mr. Arafat must perform. Mr. Arafat must do his job. I ’ve called upon 
Mr. Arafat in the past, I ’ll continue to call upon Mr. Arafat to lead. The 
other day -somebody asked me one time, a while ago, they said, has he 
disappointed you, has he lost your respect. I said, well, he hasn’t earned 
my respect yet. He must earn my respect by leading. And there are a lot 
of people, a lot of Palestinians who are suffering, and now is the time for 
him to step up. (April 28)
Here, Bush seems to blame Arafat both for the violence against Israel, but also for the
suffering of the Palestinians. Bush’s rhetoric seems to turn all sides against Arafat by
painting him as an obstacle to peace, who must “step up” to “earn my respect” (April 28).
The issue of respect that emerges in this quote adds a personal tone to the President’s
characterizations of Arafat. Bush’s explanation of how Mr. Arafat “must earn my respect
by leading” implies a personal issue between the two leaders (April 28).
Aside from implicitly laying blame, this statement suggests the Palestinian leader
must measure up, or prove himself to Bush. It carries the message that Arafat is not
stepping up, so to speak, in the peace process. Compared with the Saudi Crown Prince,
whose role in the peace process is nearly fawned over by the administration, Arafat
appears to drag his heels. It leads the reader to conclude that Middle-East conflict results
from the failed leadership of Yasir Arafat, not from the myriad of circumstantial, cultural,
and historical factors contributing to this epic conflict. In effect, Arafat’s vilification
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serves makes him appear threatening both to the Israelis and to his own people. Hence,
he stands figuratively on the other side of a line between good and evil.
As discussed above, Bush’s criticisms of the Palestinian Chairman serve a
dramatic purpose as they personify Arafat in contrast to the Crown Prince. They may
also reflect Bush’s true feelings on the matter, but Bush’s motives are difficult to access.
Recently published accounts of White House dialogues do suggest that President Bush
has strong feelings about Arafat’s role in the Middle East. In his recently published
memoirs from office, former Press Secretary Ari Fleischer described a conversation that
took place in the Spring of 2002 between President Bush and “a respected Arab leader,”
whom Fleischer did not name (2005, 234).
“Arafat can’t get a damn thing done,” Bush complained. “Israel has created a 
martyr out of that guy.” The President thought it best if Arafat, who was now 
holed up and besieged in his mostly destroyed compound, was simply ignored for 
being a failed nonleader [sic] who incited terrorism... Bush was frustrated that 
Israel’s focus on Arafat made him a hero to the Palestinian people. The most 
influential Arab states that could help achieve peace, Bush thought, were Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt...
Arafat and his immediate, corrupt circle were the real problems, Bush thought -  
not the Palestinian people and not Ariel Sharon. (2005, 234-235).
From public knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can deduce that this
meeting took place within weeks, if not days, of the White House addresses between
April 25th and May 2nd. What is certain from the conversation, however, is a depiction of
Bush’s attitude toward the conflict. It is clear that he views Arafat as an obstacle to his
efforts in the region. It also appears that Bush perceived the situation in a dramatic
frame, which he evinces in his criticism of Arafat’s “martyr” status; his statement that
“Israel has made a martyr out of that guy” elucidates this point (2005, 234). Perhaps
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Bush reasoned that if one outcome of the conflict was to create a martyr out of Arafat, 
then the cycle would continue without any incentive for the parties to change behavior.
In sum, the White House reiterates several points when supporting its claims 
about the importance of US-Saudi relations. While officials attempt to put a positive spin 
on Saudi cooperation in the war on terror, they more frequently emphasize the Crown 
Prince’s visionary leadership toward a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian stand­
offs. White House rhetoric constructs the idea of Abdallah’s visionary leadership by 
stressing a multilateral approach to the conflict that will necessitate the initiative from 
leaders like Abdallah. This regional approach also identifies with other leaders, namely 
Yasir Arafat, about whom Bush is particularly critical. By way of contrast, Bush’s 
criticisms of Arafat merely help bolster a more polished image of the Saudi Crown 
Prince.
The administration also positions the Saudis within the larger historical context of 
the war on terror, and in doing so, depicts their role as ‘good-guys’ in the battle against 
the ‘axis of evil.’ This characterization becomes an important theme in a new rendition 
of the Cold War drama. As partners for peace, the Saudis take on a dramatic role as both 
peace makers, and also as important US allies in the war on terror. In much the same 
way as they were crucial in the US’s clandestine fight against the Soviets, described in 
Chapter II, the Saudis appeared to aid the US in a new proxy-war against worldwide 
terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda.
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Relational Metaphors and the Rhetoric o f Domestication
In supporting claims about the strength of the US-Saudi partnership, White House 
officials used a strategy of domestication (Schiappa, 1989) to frame the relationship in 
terms that were easily-digestible for a wide range of public audiences. As Schiappa 
described, domestication strategies use “friendly metaphors drawn from ordinary 
language to name otherwise objectionable nuclear weapons, [and] strategy” (1989, 255). 
By way of adaptation, the domestication strategy appears when White House officials 
describe both the content and purposes of the April 25th meeting through relationship 
metaphors that stress personal bonding, intimate conversations, and private interactions. 
Below, I will outline the varied appearances of this technique. Attempting to paint a 
palatable image of the US-Saudi partnership in the most positive light possible, White 
House rhetoric employs three different metaphors to personify the relationship: mutual 
appreciation, shared respect, and personal bonding.
Mutual appreciation is a recurring theme used to characterize the content of the 
leaders’ discussions. Bush “appreciated the Crown Prince’s assurances...;” he “told the 
Crown Prince how much [he] appreciate^] his vision,” and also that he appreciated the 
Crown Prince’s promise that “they will not use oil as a weapon” (April 25).
Appreciation, along with other adjectives, describes the relationship in very friendly 
terms, but certainly not ordinary. For example, Bush frequently refers to the “shared 
vision” between the two countries; hardly a normal friendship, these two parties seem to 
become visionaries for peace rather than normal pals at the bowling alley (April 25, April 
28). As Bush describes in his April 25th address, “our two nations share a vision of two 
states, Israel and Palestine,” and “there’s a shared vision. .. we must consult with our
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friends.” This frequently recurring idea of visionary leadership helps frame the 
relationship as a partnership for peace. It helps bolster a moralistic impression of the 
purpose and tone of the parties’ interactions. It appears that at the heart of the US-Saudi 
relationship is a shared vision for peace, which brings them together to forge a strong 
bond and move forward with the peace process.
In Bush’s April 25th address, he explains that the Crawford Ranch is “a place that 
is very special for me, and a place where I welcome special guests to our country.” This 
idea of Saudi “specialness” lays the foundation for a series of depictions designed to 
elevate the status of the Saudis as unique, distinctive, and inimitable diplomatic partners - 
-supporting Bush’s claims about the relationship’s strength and importance. First, the 
idea that the Saudis are our partners in peace implies their leadership in ongoing Israeli- 
Palestinian conflicts, where the Crown Prince is “a man with enormous influence in the 
Middle East” (April 25).
There are also other descriptions that protect the Saudis from criticism by 
elevating the perceived status of the Saudi partnership with reference to 9-11. For 
example, in a response to a question about the Saudis involved in the 9-11 attacks, Bush 
explained in his April 25th address that “a strategy by some would be to split the United 
States and Saudi Arabia,” which nods to an idea that has been developed in other White 
House statements. As the argument goes, the fifteen hijackers who were allegedly of 
Saudi nationality were intentionally recruited by al Qeada to sever the ties between the 
west and the Holy Kingdom. In such a scenario, an angered American public would turn 
immediately to the Saudis when laying the blame for 9-11. By setting up the relationship 
for failure and public criticism, Osama bin Laden and the 9-11 hijackers were aiming for
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a target that went far beyond the four buildings assaulted in the attacks; they were trying 
to destroy the US’s key oil source and potentially bring down the Saudi regime in the 
process (Unger, 2004; Coll, 2004). This strategy might force the removal of US troops 
from what Arabs view as the Islamic nation’s epicenter via Medina and Mecca. In this 
context, a portrait of the Saudis as victims of 9-11 has three immediate rhetorical 
functions that help deflect public criticism from the US-Saudi relationship.
First, through the Saudi-as-victim depiction, Bush attempts to reframe public 
perception of Saudi Arabia in light of a good-vs.-evil dualism. Here, Bush’s framing of 
9-11 helps support the general notion that the Saudis are victims of 9-11, and hence, on 
the ‘good’ side of the war against terror, i.e. evil. If the 9-11 hijackers were intentionally 
trying to sever the ties between the US and the Saudis, then any criticism directed at the 
Saudis seems misplaced, for the Saudis were victims of 9-11 just like their American 
counterparts. The dualism between good and evil helps categorize the ‘good’ from the 
‘bad,’ and helps position the Saudis the former. This is one example of how the dualistic 
framing of the war on terror helps shield the Saudis from criticism. It also helps 
domesticate the Saudis insofar as it describes them in a simplistic narrative about good 
and evil, in which they become easily-identifiable characters fighting against the elusive 
threat of terrorism.
Second, it deflects criticism by positioning the Saudis’ critics as aligning 
themselves with the enemy. As many critics pointed to the Saudi’s role in funding 
terrorism, their inability to control terrorist groups within the country, and the generally 
unstable nature of their domestic rule, criticisms now seem misinformed or short-sighted. 
.For example, Bush’s reiteration of the idea that 9-11 was intended to sever the US-Saudi
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connection implies that those who criticize the relationship are doing exactly what the 
terrorists wanted. Indeed, one could argue that Osama bin Laden, given his proximity to 
the royal family, his deep connections with both Saudi and US intelligence operations, 
and his growing animosity toward the west, would make an ideal candidate to draw 
criticism on the Saudis. It would seem that any attempt by the US to press the Saudis on 
key issues like terror funding and the incubation of radical Islam are illogical because 
they serve the enemy’s interests. This notion that the Saudis suffered from 9-11 along 
side the US preserves and heightens perceptions of the Saudi partnership by reframing 
the Saudis in relation to 9-11 instead of other, more complicated, issues. This idea also 
deflects key criticisms of the Saudi role in producing 15 of the 19 hijackers and their 
support for al-Qaeda, in addition to their influential relationship with Wahhabi Islam, 
Osama bin Laden, and the Bin Laden family, as discussed in Chapter II. Similarly, the 
Saudi-as-victim idea also helps domesticate the Saudis because they become ‘just like 
us,’ wounded on the battlefield of good and evil.
Aside from preserving the image of Saudi “specialness” or inimitability, other 
descriptions emphasize the mutual respect between the parties. When discussing the 
content of the discussions, Bush frequently uses the term “respect,” most frequently in his 
April 25th address. During the same address, the question of whether the Saudis will use 
the “oil weapon” emerged, to which Bush acknowledged that “Saudi Arabia made it 
clear, and has made it clear publicly, that they will not use oil as a weapon. And I 
appreciate that, respect that, and expect that to be the case.” Throughout his statements, 
as well as in subsequent White House responses, the word “respect” reappears describing 
the respect the parties have for each other, the mutual respect for the parties, visions of
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peace, and so forth. Respect operates as an adjective with subjects tied to the relationship
-visions, positions, views, and the like. Again, the primary function of this word is to
characterize a diplomatic relationship as if it were a warm friendship.
Another key theme in White House statements is personal bonding, which
personifies the relationship. Terms like partnership, friendship, respect, understanding,
and appreciation, all support a more pervasive theme of personal bonding, which Bush
relies upon when describing his interactions with the Crown Prince. He uses these
themes to characterize or personify the relationship through simplistic folksy narratives.
During his questioning, Bush provides two narratives that very clearly elucidate the
bonding theme. The first comes after the April 25th address, when Bush responds to a
reporter’s question about his ability to smooth over the Arab leader after Bush’s
description of Ariel Sharon as a “man of peace” (April 25, 2002)
Bush: Well, first of all, one of the really positive things out of this meeting was 
the fact that the Crown Prince and I established a strong personal bond. We spent 
a lot of time alone, discussing our respective visions, talking about our families. I 
was most interested in learning about how he thought about things. I ’m 
convinced that the stronger our personal bond is, the more likely it is relations 
between our country will be strong... (April 25, 2002)
This passage directly frames the relationship as a personal friendship. Of special
importance is the way Bush describes the content of their relationship. They talked about
what he vaguely describes as “respective visions,” and about their families (April 25).
Bush’s comment that he is “interested” in the Crown Prince’s thoughts says even less
about the true substance of their several-hour meeting (April 25). As Bush’s account
suggests, the two world leaders had an open conversation about their families and views
on the world. This account, however, makes a bold move as it positions a personal
relationship ahead of an official one. Bush’s statement toward the end of this passage
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balances a diplomatic relationship with a personal friendship. He equates a strong
personal bond with a strong bi-lateral relationship, as if diplomacy lies in becoming best
friends with your counterpart before beginning hard-nosed, interest-based conversations.
Here, descriptions of the relationship’s content and purpose converge on the idea that
personal relationships precede official duties. If the President’s friendship with a Saudi
royal is productive, then the relationship between our two countries will prosper as well.
It seems that what is good for George W. Bush is also good for America.
In another response, Bush goes further in-depth about his interactions with the
Crown Prince. Near the end of the April 25th address, Bush responded to a question
about his engagement with Arab nations in the following narrative:
[The meeting] went on quite a while because there was a lot to discuss, plus, I 
want you to know, I had the honor of showing him my ranch. He’s a man who’s 
got a farm and he understands the land, and I really took great delight in being 
able to drive him around in a pickup truck and showing [sic] him the trees and my 
favorite spots. And we saw a wild turkey, which was good. But we had a very 
good discussion, and I ’m honored he came to visit. (April 25)
Here we see a story of two men, going for a drive in a pickup truck on a ranch. Their
friendship seems consecrated by this intimate act of male bonding. Apparently, Bush
took the Crown Prince for a drive to show him around, and point out some of his
“favorite spots.” In terms of its ceremonial appeal, the narrative Bush tells above
presents a westernized version of diplomatic formality; it depicts the relationship not just
as an intimate friendship, but as a family affair. The ranch location is important in
facilitating this appearance because, as opposed to the White House, Camp David, or
other diplomatic forums, the ranch is owned by the Bush family, not the US government.
As such, the imagery of this backdrop reinforces the personal dimension of the
relationship.
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There is also a sense of male bonding that emerges in the pickup-truck narrative. 
When Bush explained during the April 25th address that “He’s a man who’s got a farm 
and he understands the land, and I really took great delight in being able to drive him 
around in a pickup truck,” he is telling a story about male bonding. The two apparently 
had a long drive and a good conversation, which describes a scene of men bonding on a 
western landscape, commenting on wild turkeys and discussing their views on the world. 
This fatherly escapade is reminiscent also of a familiar event many would place within 
the context of a story about family. Two paternal father figures get away from the house 
to talk business and to bond as men. Here, family rhetoric becomes clearer in Bush’s 
narrative where descriptions of a friendly sight-seeing tour of the family ranch help 
reinforce a familial tone. The context of the Bush’s family ranch paints a picture akin to 
a family visit, or a neighbor stopping by on a Saturday afternoon. As opposed to a formal 
negotiation, intense trade talks, or other diplomatic functions, the two simply had a 
“visit.” According to Bush, the two had a conversation about his favorite locations, the 
lay of the land, and other pleasant notables like a wild turkey. His narrations of the day’s 
events paint a very folksy, neighborly visit occurring before a backdrop of a Texas family 
ranch. In effect, Bush’s narration of the events paints a relatable picture of a diplomatic 
meeting. He tells a story about family, friendship, and community in the language of 
western narratives and folklore. Bush’s ceremonial descriptions dovetail with the 
speech’s central thesis and a crucial rhetorical premise: the US-Saudi relationship is 
important and strong. In terms of tone and content, this relationship is framed as part 
friendship, part family relation, and part diplomatic partnership. The ceremony takes on 
a warm, friendly, feel, with words like “special,” “cordial,” and “honor,” describing the
US-Saudi Diplomacy 103
meeting and its location; the family ranch is “very special for me,” “a place where I 
welcome special guests to our country” (April 25).
The setting of the address also enriches these descriptions. As guests to a 
reception at the President’s home in Texas, the Saudis appear to hold pre-imminent 
diplomatic status. As opposed to the White House, the Saudi Embassy in Washington 
D.C., or the US Embassy in Riyadh, the Crawford Ranch appears more personal, 
friendly, and familial as a diplomatic venue. It suggests the Saudis are very special and 
deserving of the President’s exclusive attention. As the descriptive context of the 
address’ metaphorical appeals, the ranch becomes background as descriptions of the 
relationship, its participants, and their interactions take the foreground.
Western values also play a central role in the official portrait of the relationship. 
By appealing to western notions of family hospitality, the narratives of the diplomatic 
visit present a palatable picture of the relationship. By focusing on ceremonial honors, 
warm discussions, and friendly pickup truck drives, the narratives found in White House 
statements create an impression of the relationship as being removed from its interest- 
based foundations. Rhetorically, this narrative conceives of a diplomatic relationship as a 
friendship, family visit, or a polite neighborly discussion. It indicates little if anything 
about the true substance of the conversation; rather, it distills the meeting into an easily 
understood metaphor: a family visit. As with any narrative, Bush’s creates a warm 
friendly tone in his descriptions of the form and content of the discussions. Highlighting 
such ceremonial details, official rhetoric substitutes descriptive relational metaphors in 
place of a more pragmatic outline of the relationship’s real interests.
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By simplifying the relationship into a descriptive metaphor, Bush’s narratives 
function as a simplification mechanism akin to Schiappa’s domestication and 
bureaucratization motifs (1989). Drawing upon a friendly metaphor from ordinary 
language (1989), the Crawford narrative simplifies an otherwise complex relationship 
into something easily-understood. The domestication strategy employed in official 
rhetoric constructs a descriptive narrative of the relationship that emphasizes mutual 
appreciation, shared respect, and personal bonding to create a set of relational metaphors. 
In its content, the relationship takes on a friendly, familial, and personal tone while 
demonstrating to the audience the ‘strength’ of the partnership. A high-level meeting 
between two diplomatic partners becomes a friendly visit between family friends. Hard- 
headed negotiations become a drive across the ranch to see a wild turkey. When one 
considers the strategic dimensions of the US-Saudi partnership, this narrative seems 
detached from reality. In this sense, the western narrative “sanitizes” the relationship in a 
way that distances the public from it (1989). By developing a mythical re-creation of a 
diplomatic partnership, Bush’s address removes the relationship from public criticism by 
making only descriptive appeals and depicting the details of a high-level meeting 
between two major world powers with themes like family, friendship, and personal 
bonding. As with any metaphorical description, the ties between concrete or abstract 
descriptions and the collection of values they symbolize is where the persuasive effect 
takes its course.
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IV Discussion
After developing both the historical overview and rhetorical analysis in the two 
preceding chapters, this Chapter will discuss how previous chapters addressed this 
study’s first and second formal research questions. Answering RQ1,1 will discuss how 
official rhetoric reframes the public’s understanding of the US-Saudi partnership. 
Considering the conclusions found in the history chapter, we see the real nature of the 
US-Saudi partnership has far more to do with complex economic and security issues than 
official rhetoric suggested. Here, I argue that the White House’s use of morally- 
dichotomous good-vs.-evil framing, together with its emphasis on domestication 
techniques clouds the underlying issues and interests that drive the relationship in favor 
of a more passable and simplistic narrative about war and peace.
Secondly, in response to RQ2, the analysis chapter reveals innovative adaptations 
of two rhetorical strategies: prophetic dualism (Wander, 1984) and domestication as per 
Schiappa (1989). I will first discuss how the White House’s adaptation of prophetic 
dualism re-configures conceptions of the Cold War drama as per Stuckey (1995). 
Specifically, I will first argue that a one-sided construction of the prophetic dualism 
allows official rhetoric to echo the Cold War drama within the dichotomous moral 
framing of the ‘War on Terror.’ Then, I will outline how the White House’s use of 
descriptive relational metaphors constitutes a new innovation in domestication strategy, 
urging a need for scholars to expand Schiappa’s (1989) conception of domestication to 
include issues of personification.
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History and its Double
In response to RQ1, the historical overview and analysis chapters tell us much 
about the underlying interests of the US-Saudi partnership as well as how White House 
rhetoric portrays these interests. Official rhetoric clouds the true nature of the US-Saudi 
partnership by focusing on a morally-dichotomous rendition of the relationship that fails 
to convey any sense of moral ambiguity or realism in terms of the relationship’s 
underlying interests.
As outlined in the history chapter, the foundations of the US-Saudi partnership 
have always centered on economic and strategic interests that are complex and multi­
dimensional. For example, the economic interests in the relationship were far from 
simple. While the US benefited from Saudi oil exports as a primary source of crude, it 
also experienced a wave of investment in US markets from the estimated $840 billion of 
Saudi royal spending (Unger, 2004). On the other hand, the Saudi Kingdom received a 
rapid infusion of infrastructure, technology, and military development and training from 
the US. In terms of economic interests alone, the relationship encompasses multiple 
dimensions each with its own layers of interested parties, companies, government 
officials, and so on.
The military component of the relationship, as discussed in Chapter II, is equally 
complex and multi-faceted. Chapter II discussed how the Saudis became increasingly 
involved in US clandestine military operations in the Middle-East and Central Asia, 
primarily to combat the spread of communism and balance regional threats such as Iran’s 
Ayatolla or Iraq’s Hussein. But they also became an informal outpost and central 
command facility for US troops; from there, US operations during the first Gulf War
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would target Iraqi forces from holy Muslim soil. The Saudis also helped recruit a 
Muslim army to fight the soviets in Afghanistan, where they enlisted the help of Saudi 
Billionare Osama bin Laden, who later lead a team of hijackers to attack the US on 9-11. 
These are just three examples of the different military dimensions of the relationship, 
each with its own complexities and dynamics.
If anything, these issues -economic and strategic, entail multi-dimensional 
interests, complexities within each of those interests, and lastly, a pronounced need for 
secrecy due to the sensitive nature of each interest. The rhetorical presentation of this 
relationship however, greatly avoids any mention of these nuances, ambiguities, and 
underlying interests. In fact, if official rhetoric serves any function in relation to the 
actual history of US-Saudi diplomacy, it clouds the ‘real’ nature of the relationship in 
exchange for a much more palatable and simplistic rendition.
White House rhetoric, in its adaptations of prophetic dualism and domestication, 
obscures important details about the US-Saudi relationship in three different ways. First, 
it distorts the underlying interests that drive the partnership. After the 2002 Crawford 
meeting, official rhetoric focused on the war on terror and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts. Bush described the relationship in terms of its importance to peace in the world 
and in the Middle East (April 25), and explained the strength of the relationship in terms 
of the warm and personable interactions between President Bush and the Crown Prince 
Abdullah. By describing the partnership in terms of its importance to the world and the 
Middle-East, Bush reframed the central issues of the partnership in accordance with a 
narrow interpretation that fit within the ‘war on terror,’ good vs. evil narrative. It painted
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a sterling picture of the Saudis while masking many unresolved public criticisms of the 
relationship.
In contrast, if officials framed the relationship in terms of its importance to each
party, then Middle-East peace and the War on Terror would pale in comparison to the
current price of oil, the (then imminent) invasion of Iraq, and other salient interests. But
because Bush’s framing supports a specific narrative that emphasizes the war on terror
and the ongoing conflict in the West Bank, official accounts of mutual interests like oil
supply and regional security are but tertiary concerns within a moralistic narrative about a
battle between good and evil.
Secondly, official rhetoric removes critical issues of public concern from the
scope of public debate. Namely, latent and growing threats to US national security may
originate from within the Saudi state. Yet, when questioned about these threats, officials
reiterate essentially narrative responses that only reinforce the good vs. evil framing of
the war on terror and subsequently position the Saudis as helping rather than harming this
effort. After Bush’s April 25 address (2002), he gave the following response to question
about Saudi support for terrorism:
[Reporter]:... You said that the Crown Prince is against terror... Do you believe 
the leadership is doing enough to deal with their own problems with terrorism that 
comes out of their own country? Fifteen of the 19 hijackers—
[Bush]: Yes, I— the Crown Prince has been very strong in condemning the murder 
of US citizens. He’s been very strong about condemning those who committed 
those murders. ... Right after 9/11, he was one of the strongest voices of 
condemnation. He understands how devious Osama bin Laden has been...
This passage responds to the issue of Saudi terrorism by simply reiterating the ‘peace
maker’ narrative attached to the Crown Prince. Emphasizing Abdullah’s condemnation
of terror, Bush implies that because the Crown Prince denounces terror publicly, that 1)
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he can prevent it from occurring in his regime, and 2) he receives support in this effort 
from the rest of Saudi leaders. The truth of Saudi stability is quite different than it 
appears here. The public is left to assume that, like the President of the United States, the 
de-facto ruler of Saudi Arabia enjoys the same latitude of influence over public policy 
and state administration when this is far from the truth.
As outlined by Clarke (2004), Crile (2003), Coll (2004), and Schwartz (2003), the 
Saudi regime is greatly divided between pro- and anti-western advocates. Some, like 
Saudi Ambassador to the US and long-time Bush associate Prince Bandar bin Sultan, or 
Crown Prince Abdullah, enjoy warm and positive relations with the west. Others in the 
family however denounce US customs, policy, and culture while openly admiring figures 
like Osama bin Laden and supporting religious groups closely associated with Muslim 
terrorist groups like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, and others (Baer, 2003; 
Clarke, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). In short, there is a great divide in terms of US support 
within the Saudi regime, and this division is not apparent in any of the White House’s 
statements about Saudi leadership, cooperation in the war on terror, or any other issue 
related to the relationship in even the most general terms. The administration’s 
descriptive account of this partnership obscures the conflicts within Saudi Arabia over 
their relationship with the US.
Third, and most important, is the impact of value-oriented rhetorical strategies 
that obscure moral ambiguity. Domestication and prophetic dualism, as outlined in the 
literature review and textual analysis sections, are collections of appeals that describe the 
US-Saudi partnership through value-oriented metaphors. The one-sided construction of 
prophetic dualism emphasizes the positive or ‘good’ in the relationship and puts a moral
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spin on the relationship. As we see from the history chapter, the underlying interests of 
the partnership are encumbered with moral ambiguity that is difficult to resolve. The 
case of Osama bin Laden is a most salient example of this ambiguity.
On the one hand, bin Laden served a valuable role in the clandestine war against 
the Soviets. On the other hand, he was the alleged mastermind behind the events of 9-11 
and is now the US’s most wanted fugitive (Coll, 2004). This is one of many cases that 
show the murky moral substance of the relationship. We see similar examples in the 
cases of the Iran-Iraq war, the political and financial relationships between the Bushes 
and the Saudi royal family, and most recently in the issue of Saudi cooperation in the war 
on terror. As it relates to the rhetorical strategies employed by White House officials, the 
‘real’ nature of US-Saudi diplomacy entails complexities, nuances, overlapping interests, 
secrecy, and moral ambiguity that cannot receive adequate development in the simplistic 
narratives used by public officials to support US policy toward Saudi Arabia. In short, 
White House rhetoric obscures much of the true substance of the relationship in favor of 
a more simplistic, palatable account.
Prophetic Dualism and the War on Terror: Re-Telling the Cold War Drama
With reference to RQ2, White House rhetoric adapted two rhetorical strategies. 
The first is W ander’s (1984) prophetic dualism, which relies upon a moral dichotomy 
between good and evil, right and wrong, etc. As one notices from the analysis chapter, 
much of the White House’s rhetoric focuses on constructing the positive or good side of 
this dichotomy. Although other official rhetoric mentions America’s fight against 
terrorism, evildoers, murderers and the like, in the context of US-Saudi relations, it more
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frequently frames these issues in terms of ‘the good’ -peace, partnership, vision, 
leadership, and others. Whether talking about world peace, middle-east peace, visionary 
leadership, or Arab multilateralism, the White House allocates most of its rhetorical 
resources to constructing notions of these ‘goods.’ In doing'so, officials take every effort 
to develop narratives and build ideas about good people (Bush and the Crown Prince, the 
US and the Saudis, etc.) doing good things -partners for peace, partners against terrorism, 
and others.
This emphasis on the ‘good’ is a noteworthy adaptation for two reasons. First, it 
signals the lasting reverberation of the White House’s moralistic framing following 9-11. 
As outlined by Bostdorff (2003), George Bush’s rhetoric after 9-11 appealed to the notion 
of America’s “national covenant,” a strategy that was based on a puritanical moral 
framing of the 9-11 attacks which posited a good vs. evil ‘crusade’ against ‘evildoers’ 
(293). Eventually, when Bush gave his State of the Union address, just months after the 
attacks, his introduction of the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor propelled the use of moral framing 
in descriptions of international conflict and foreign policy. As discussed in the analysis 
chapter, Bush’s introduction of the ‘Axis of Evil’ signaled a new rendition of the Cold 
War drama that encapsulated national actors in a good vs. evil struggle against ruthless 
murders intending imminent harm against the free world (Bush, Jan. 29, 2002). As it 
relates to White House rhetoric after the Crawford meeting, Bush’s moral framing of 9- 
11 provided an implicit rhetorical backdrop that allowed official rhetoric to construct 
appeals with reference to a pre-established evil. Whereas some strategies might contain 
appeals to both good and evil, the latter theme had already been established in the 
President’s 2002 state of the Union Address.
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With the ‘evil’ already established, officials focused on creating the other half of 
the dualism. Within an isolated period of time, the White House’s focus on constructing 
the ‘good’ side of this dualism frames a number of isolated issues like the US-Saudi 
relationship, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Arab multilateralism in light of the 
broader war on terror. The US-Saudi partnership, for example, seems to have more to do 
with the crusade against terrorism than it does with any of the underlying issues that have 
guided the relationship since its founding. The convenience of the war on terror lies in its 
ability to frame a number of unrelated foreign policy issues under a pre-established 
rhetoric of good vs. evil. While this framing helps facilitate a one-sided construction of 
W ander’s prophetic dualism (1984), it also helps officials re-cast a Cold War narrative 
within a new historical context.
The second hallmark of official rhetoric appears in the retelling of Stuckey’s 
(1995) Cold War drama within a new and entirely different geopolitical landscape where 
the US’s enemies have been framed under a new battle against global terror. One of the 
most salient features of the Cold War drama is that it was a somewhat accurate picture of 
the Cold War relations between two major world powers, the US and the Soviet Union. 
We could understand how it was indeed a ‘cold’ war; we fought invisible enemies within 
the contexts of deniable clandestine operations at the same time with a clear and 
identifiable enemy. The US and Soviets avoided firing missiles at one another, yet the 
US launched the CIA’s largest and most successful clandestine proxy war of the 20th 
century in areas like Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America (Crile, 2003, ix-x; 
Croll, 2004). Battles were largely invisible to the public; they resulted in covert 
assassinations, kidnappings, treason, defection, and deniable US support for guerilla
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warfare in regional proxy battles like those in Afghanistan, which contributed -som e say 
lead, to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union (Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). Perhaps we 
called it the Cold War because if it ever became “hot,” the world would potentially 
crumble in the wake of full-scale nuclear engagement. In the end, the US was fighting a 
clearly defined state actor.
On the other hand, the war on terror is very much a “hot” war metaphorically 
speaking. In addition to silent clandestine victories in intelligence gathering, mole- 
finding, and other cloak-and-dagger activities, the war on terror by contrast produces very 
visible results. We see evidence of captured al-Qaeda operatives, invasions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the daily death tolls of both US and enemy combatants in the 
headlines of the New York Times. Although the public can see an identifiable enemy 
and tangible battles, they cannot attach an army to a particular national actor. While 
certain states sponsor terrorism, one particular state does not encompass the entire threat. 
The President’s ‘Axis of Evil,’ for example, mentions three State actors -Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea— but even without the influence of these states, terrorists would still enjoy a 
wide range of support in the Arab world (Schwartz, 2003; Clarke, 2004).
Unlike the Cold War, the War on Terror adds ambiguity to the notion of a State 
threat to national security, and more deeply undermines the notion of a ‘Cold’ war where 
the US was fighting an easily identifiable state threat. Despite the historical 
inconsistencies between the Cold War and the War on Terror metaphors, official rhetoric 
effectively recasts the narrative of an old struggle to meet new international 
circumstances. The good vs. evil framing via prophetic dualism emerges as the most
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prominent frame for the US’s war on terror, and hence, describes several isolated foreign
policy issues like the US-Saudi partnership, Middle-East peace, and others.
The fact that White House rhetoric pays such great attention to constructing
Wander’s (1984) prophetic dualism indicates this strategy’s versatility in repositioning
foreign policy issues in respect to particular historical developments. For example, by
emphasizing the importance of US-Saudi relations to the cause of world peace and
Middle-East peace, the role of Arab multi-lateralism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or
the need for our best allies to publicly condemn terrorism, the White House uses
particular historical developments to contrast its construction of ‘the good’ in light of ‘the
bad.’ The use of this moral framing, however, seems to suggest that White House
officials may view their foreign policy decisions through a similar moral lens.
To adapt their rhetorical strategies, officials rely upon this moral framework
provided by the ‘Axis of Evil,’ and the descriptions of the terrorist threat found in the
President’s 2000 State of the Union address to provide background for a ‘good’ effort
against evil. The frequent use of this morally dichotomous framing indicates that
morality is, to some extent, a foundational consideration for this Administration’s foreign
policy decision-making. In her address at Johns Hopkins University, shortly after the
Crawford address, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explained the
Administration’s reliance upon moral rationale in its foreign policy decisions:
America... will use [its] influence to favor freedom. There are right and wrong 
choices and right and wrong acts. And governments are making them every day 
for their own people and for the people of the world. We can never let the 
intricacies of cloistered debate -  with its many hues of gray and nuance -  obscure 
the need to speak and act with moral clarity. We must recognize that some states 
or leaders will choose wrongly. We must recognize that truly evil regimes will 
never be reformed...
US-Saudi Diplomacy 115
Nations must decide which side they are on in the fault line that divides 
civilization from terror. They must decide whether to embrace the paradigm of 
progress: democracy and freedom and human rights, and clean limited 
government. (April 29, 2002)
Rice speaks about a division between a civilized world and a terrorized one; she speaks
of right and wrong, good and evil, and implies a with-us-or-against-us view of
international relations. She describes the importance of moral clarity and a reminder that
officials should “never let the intricacies of cloistered debate -w ith its many hues of gray
and nuance— obscure” this importance (April 29, 2002). While her moral vision is quite
explicit, the more pertinent issue is the degree to which this moral framing influences her,
and other White House decision makers’, foreign policy decisions.
Later, Rice addressed this issue. When a reporter questioned the White House’s
reliance on moral dichotomies to explain international policy, they pointed out, “you
[Rice] use a lot of moral dichotomies -there’s a fault line, there’s the good, the evil... but
it seems that the realities of foreign policy are much more complicated,” and he gave an
example of this complication by stating that, “America has to engage with some regimes
that are either anti-democratic, like Saudi Arabia, or with dubious moral records, [like]
Israel” (April 29, 2002). After explaining the statement, the reporter asked, do “you feel
that this moral rhetoric... createfs] a perception of hypocrisy and threatens America’s
credibility?” (April 29). To this pointed question, Rice offered a response that says much
about the Official framing of foreign policy decisions when she stated:
Look, the truth of the matter is, though, unless you know where you’re going, 
unless you’re clear about where you’re going, you will go nowhere. And what 
moral clarity gives you is a compass against which to measure everything else -  
because you’re right, it is a complex world, it’s a hard world. The complexities 
bring you into different kinds of situations in which different tactics are 
important.
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But if you ever lose sight of what you think is wrong and what is right, then you 
have nothing to guide you. And if you ever lose sight of the fact that there is 
wrong and right, you have nothing to guide you. (April 29)
Her emphasis on moral “compass” indicates that morality serves as a kind of interpretive
lens for official decision making. Morality becomes a concept through which the
complex world of international affairs can be interpreted. Rice seems to disdain the
“cloistered debate” and its “hues of gray and nuance,” which helps illustrate her
preference for easily-discernable values. If anything, the role of moral framing helps
decision makers by clearing up the ambiguities and complexities that come along with all
foreign policy decisions. In terms of its influence on the Administration’s framing of
foreign policy issues, the US-Saudi partnership in particular, this sense of moral clarity is
most evident in their public justifications for policy. So if Rice’s depiction of morality
and its role in decision making is correct, then her comments help explain the substance
and framing of official rhetoric.
In terms of its importance to communication theory, the emphasis on constructing
‘the good’ within a dichotomous moral framing indicates an important adaptation of both
prophetic dualism (Wander, 1984) and the Cold War drama (Stuckey, 1995). Here,
theorists should note a re-configuration of the Cold War drama to fit new historical
trends. Through the one-sided construction of Wander’s prophetic dualism, official
rhetoric effectively recasts the Cold War narrative to include a new set of historical
realities. This suggests that moralistic dramatized descriptions of foreign policy issues
can be retold in many different historical circumstances regardless of their congruence
with reality. Although scholars may argue over the efficacy with which the
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administration employs this strategy, its appearance in the Crawford and post-Crawford 
addresses remains a salient feature of White House rhetoric on the US-Saudi partnership.
Domestication and Personification
A second strategy seen in the post-Crawford addresses indicates an expanded 
version of Schiappa’s (1989) domestication strategy that makes use of relational 
metaphors. As discussed in the analysis, descriptive themes like partnership, mutual 
respect, appreciation, family, personal bonding, male bonding, western hospitality, and 
the like, all domesticate the relationship. Although these themes certainly facilitate a 
domestication of the relationship by relying upon simplistic metaphors drawn from 
“ordinary language” (1989), these descriptive appeals go beyond simplifying a 
complicated relationship insofar as they construct a persona or an impression of the 
relationship that personifies both the content and characters involved in the partnership. 
Crown Prince Abdallah, for example, is the subject of very glowing descriptions as a 
peace visionary, a partner, man of “enormous influence,” a family friend, even “a man 
who’s got a farm and understands the land,” and all reiterate his positive personal 
qualities that make him such a distinguished partner to the US, especially when 
contrasted with Yasir Arafat as discussed above (Bush, April 25).
Domesticating the Crown Prince also ‘Westernizes’ and de-orientalizes him. As 
discussed in Chapter III, Americans were skeptical of a country that produced the 9-11 
hijackers and Osama bin Laden. In many ways, few Americans had come to appreciate 
the values, history, and cultural nuances of the Arab world, opting for the images and 
stereotypes they saw on Television and in films. Therefore, as a visual rhetoric, the
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appearance of the Saudi Crown Prince alongside President Bush at the Crawford Ranch 
had a subtle but powerful appeal to certain domestic audiences. The westernized 
appearance of the talks helped Americans relate to the Crown Prince as someone who 
was ‘just like us.’ As President Bush explained, the Crown Prince had a ranch and knew 
the land, just like a Midwestern farmer or a farm hand. In the White House’s rendition of 
the visit, the Crown Prince became a character in a narrative that took place on a western 
landscape - a  ranch in Texas nonetheless. Likening the Crown Prince to westerners via 
the ranch motif, Bush delivered the subtle message that the Crown Prince -and the Saudis 
by association, are just like us. White House rhetoric, therefore, created an impression of 
the Prince that was familiar and friendly, just as Bush described him. This rhetoric 
‘westernized’ the Saudis to help improve their image with domestic audiences.
In sum, however, these characterizations and personifications of the Crown Prince 
and the Saudis functioned rhetorically in a manner that has not been fully explored by 
foreign policy scholars. By creating specific descriptions of national actors and 
diplomatic relationships, the domestication strategy seen in the analysis chapter include 
issues of personification that make it distinct from Schiappa’s original rendition. In sum, 
the Administration’s use of relational metaphors to domesticate the US-Saudi partnership 
indicates a new form of domestication as it attempts to personify the relationship. 
Additionally, the ‘westernizing’ of the Arab Prince showed an equally innovative 
rhetorical technique. For these reasons, foreign policy scholars should add 
personification and westernization to any list of strategic metaphors used to domesticate 
particular foreign policy issues.
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More generally, the use of metaphors and narrative as a substitute for a factual 
account of US-Saudi diplomacy distorts the true nature of the relationship. A story about 
good and evil, the war on terror, and the partnership for peace, reads like a novel. It 
entertains more than it informs. White House rhetoric describes US-Saudi relations like a 
wild west novel as it distinguishes the good characters from the bad in an effort to 
simplify the history of a complex multifaceted relationship into a quick dramatic sound­
bite. In the end, domestication and prophetic dualism turn a factual historical relationship 
into an easily-digestible tale about two partners waging a war against terror. It says 
nothing, for example, about how many of the 9-11 hijackers emerged from Saudi Arabia. 
Nor does explain the considerable ambiguity surrounding Osama bin Laden, who at one 
time was the US’s front-man in the war against the Soviets. Neither does it identify the 
murky relationship between Saudi oil, Western industry, and US foreign policy. It also 
fails to describe the strategic services offered by the Saudi Kingdom. And while it 
obscures the reality of the relationship, White House rhetoric also severely limits the 
public’s understanding of a vital foreign policy issue that impacts US national security.
By limiting the public’s understanding of the US-Saudi relationship, White House 
rhetoric removes a paramount topic from public discourse and criticism. Because the 
Saudis are so deeply tied to US national security interests, their role in US foreign policy 
should command a leading position in public discourse. Instead, the Saudi role is either 
over-simplified, distorted, or narrowly criticized. White House rhetoric certainly 
commits the first two of these tactics while contributing to the third. The Michael 
Moores of the world will continually assail the relationship without a fuller understanding 
of its historical and strategic underpinnings, yet, White House rhetoric, with its emphasis
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on distorted narratives and over-simplified renditions of history, seems to only invite 
such criticism.
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